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Summary Table 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Output (Real Annual Growth %)      
Private Consumer Expenditure -1.2 -1.2 -0.8 1.5 2.0 
Public Net Current Expenditure -2.1 -2.1 1.4 0.0 0.0 
Investment -2.9 5.0 -2.4 14.3 12.8 
Exports 5.5 4.7 1.1 5.6 5.1 
Imports -0.6 6.9 0.6 4.4 4.5 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 2.8 -0.3 0.2 5.0 4.7 
Gross National Product (GNP) -0.8 1.1 3.3 4.9 4.6 
 
    
 
  
    
 
Prices (Annual Growth %) 
    
 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 2.6 1.7 0.5 0.3 0.5 
Growth in Average Hourly Earnings 2.1 0.9 2.4 0.0 1.0 
 
    
 
  
    
 
Labour Market 
    
 
Employment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 1,855 1,842 1,880 1,913 1,962 
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 317 316 282 244 210 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 14.6 14.7 13.0 11.3 9.7 
 
    
 
  
    
 
Public Finance 
    
 
General Government Balance (€ bn) -21.6 -13.9 -10.0 -6.5 -4.7 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) -12.6 -8.0 -5.7 -3.5 -2.4 
General Government Debt (% of GDP) 111.1 121.7 123.3 113.4 106.1 
 
    
 
  
    
 
External Trade 
    
 
Balance of Payments Current Account (€ bn) 0.1 1.5 6.6 8.5 10.2 
Current Account (% of GNP) 0.1 1.1 4.5 5.5 6.2 
 
    
 
 
    
 
Demand 
    
 
Final Demand 2.7 2.4 0.5 4.8 4.6 
Domestic Demand -0.7 -0.6 -0.3 3.7 4.0 
Domestic Demand (excl. Stocks) -1.7 -0.2 -0.7 3.7 4.0 
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Summary 
The Irish economy has seen significant growth in 2014 with improvements 
observable across a broad set of key indicators. Output growth (both GNP and 
GDP) is set to increase by approximately 5 per cent while unemployment will fall 
to just over 11 per cent. A key feature of economic developments in 2014 has 
been the particularly strong performance of taxation receipts with all major items 
reporting significant year-on-year increases. The net consequence of this is a 
fiscal deficit of approximately 3.5 per cent for this year; this is a full percentage 
point better than was expected this time last year. 
 
We expect the recovery and strong output growth rates to continue into 2015. 
The Research Note by Byrne and McQuinn suggests that, notwithstanding the 
recent improvements, the Irish economy still appears to be operating at 
somewhat below its potential level. While the continued poor performance of the 
Euro Area constitutes a significant downside risk for future domestic growth 
prospects, we expect continued strong foreign demand for Irish goods and 
services next year. This will almost certainly be complemented by a significant 
contribution to growth from domestic sources. Investment, in particular, will see 
sizeable increases next year, albeit from a low base, while the outlook for 
consumption is also positive despite the still sizeable levels of household and 
corporate debt prevalent in the economy.  
 
Previous Commentaries have discussed at length various difficulties with 
interpreting Irish national accounts. Contract manufacturing has emerged as 
another such issue. Overall, because of this and other reasons, we continue to 
use GNP, rather than GDP, as our main economic indicator. We expect output 
growth of 4.6 per cent in 2015 with unemployment set to fall to 9.7 per cent. 
 
The 2015 budget is the subject of some analysis in this Commentary. From a 
macroeconomic perspective, we feel the budget, by being quite expansionary in 
nature, was less cautious than we would have preferred. In the previous 
Commentary we had suggested a neutral fiscal policy, which would have resulted 
in a greater margin of error in achieving the 3 per cent deficit target next year. 
We now forecast the deficit in 2015 to be 2.4 per cent. In the Special Article by 
Keane, Callan, Savage, Walsh and Colgan, the regressive nature of the budget is 
highlighted with estimates suggesting the poorest 10 per cent of households will 
experience a decline of 1 per cent in income due to the budgetary measures. 
Middle income groups saw little change in their incomes, while there were small 
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gains for high income households; just over half of one per cent for the top 
income group. Using the same approach, the analysis also estimates that, for 
budgets over the period 2009 to 2015, the highest income groups have 
experienced the most significant income losses, while the next most affected 
group was those on the lowest incomes. 
 
The Commentary also contains a special Appendix outlining an assessment of the 
Central Bank’s proposed macro-prudential measures. While the adoption of a 
macro-prudential system is in principle a welcome and highly sensible 
development in an Irish context, the Appendix argues that in the interests of 
efficient policy implementation and transparency, such measures should be 
applied on a counter-cyclical rules basis. Additionally, the Appendix notes that 
were such a rule applied in the Irish market at present, it is unlikely that the 
counter-cycle measures proposed in the Appendix would be applied in the 
current context. Finally, it is suggested that regular analysis of relevant indicators 
in the housing and property market should be both conducted and published in 
framing a macro-prudential system. 
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National Accounts 2013 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2012 2013 Change in 2013 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 82.5 83.3 1.1 1.9 -0.8 
Public Net Current Expenditure 25.9 26.0 0.1 -1.2 1.4 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 26.9 26.5 -1.4 1.0 -2.4 
Exports of Goods and Services 182.5 184.1 0.8 -0.3 1.1 
Physical Changes in Stocks 0.3 0.8    
Final Demand 318.1 320.7 0.8 0.3 0.5 
less:      
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 147.1 147.7 0.4 -0.2 0.6 
Statistical Discrepancy 1.7 1.8    
GDP at Market Prices 172.8 174.8 1.2 1.0 0.2 
Net Factor Payments (F) -31.5 -27.3    
GNP at Market Prices 141.2 147.5 4.4 1.1 3.3 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2012 2013 Change in 2013 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.0 3.0 0.0 0.3 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 69.5 71.9 2.3 3.4 
Other 63.7 61.1 -2.6 -4.1 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.1 0.6 
  Statistical Discrepancy -1.7 -1.8 
  Net Domestic Product 134.5 134.8 0.4 0.3
Net Factor Payments -31.5 -27.3 4.2 -13.4 
National Income 102.9 107.5 4.6 4.5 
Depreciation 23.0 23.7 0.6 2.6 
GNP at Factor Cost 126.0 131.2 5.2 4.1 
Taxes less Subsidies 15.2 16.3 1.1 6.9 
GNP at Market Prices 141.2 147.5 6.3 4.4 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2012 2013 Change in 2013 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X - M 35.5 36.3 0.9 
F -31.5 -27.3 4.2 
Net Transfers -2.4 -2.5 
 Balance on Current Account 1.5 6.6 5.1
as % of GNP 1.1 4.5 3.5 
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National Accounts 2014 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2013 2014 Change in 2014 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 83.3 85.0 2.0 0.5 1.5 
Public Net Current Expenditure 26.0 25.7 -1.0 -1.0 0.0 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 26.5 31.1 17.3 2.6 14.3 
Exports of Goods and Services 184.1 195.5 6.2 0.6 5.6 
Physical Changes in Stocks 0.8 0.8 
   Final Demand 320.7 338.2 5.4 0.6 4.8
less:      
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 147.7 155.6 5.4 0.9 4.5 
Statistical Discrepancy 1.8 1.8    
GDP at Market Prices 174.8 184.4 5.5 0.4 5.0 
Net Factor Payments (F) -27.3 -29.0    
GNP at Market Prices 147.5 155.4 5.3 0.4 4.9 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2013 2014 Change in 2014 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.0 3.1 0.1 2.5 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 71.9 73.1 1.2 1.7 
Other 61.1 67.3 6.1 10.0 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.6 0.6 
  Statistical Discrepancy -1.8 -1.8 
  Net Domestic Product 134.8 142.2 7.4 5.5
Net Factor Payments -27.3 -29.0 -1.7 6.3 
National Income 107.5 113.2 5.7 5.3 
Depreciation 23.7 24.0 0.3 1.4 
GNP at Factor Cost 131.2 137.2 6.0 4.6 
Taxes less Subsidies 16.3 18.1 1.8 11.1 
GNP at Market Prices 147.5 155.4 7.8 5.3 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2013 2014 Change in 2014 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X - M 36.3 39.9 3.6 
F -27.3 -29.0 -1.7 
Net Transfers -2.5 -2.5 0.0 
Balance on Current Account 6.6 8.5 1.9 
as % of GNP 4.5 5.4 1.2 
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National Accounts 2015 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2014 2015 Change in 2015 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 85.0 87.6 3.0 1.0 2.0 
Public Net Current Expenditure 25.7 25.8 0.5 0.5 0.0 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 31.1 36.0 15.8 2.6 12.8 
Exports of Goods and Services 195.5 207.6 6.2 1.1 5.1 
Physical Changes in Stocks 0.8 1.0    
Final Demand 338.2 358.0 5.9 1.2 4.6 
less:      
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 155.6 164.1 5.4 0.9 4.5 
Statistical Discrepancy 1.8 1.8    
GDP at Market Prices 184.4 195.7 6.2 1.4 4.7 
Net Factor Payments (F) -29.0 -30.9    
GNP at Market Prices 155.4 164.8 6.1 1.4 4.6 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2014 2015 Change in 2015 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.1 3.2 0.1 2.5 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 73.1 75.8 2.8 3.8 
Other 67.3 74.6 7.4 10.9 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.6 0.6 
  Statistical Discrepancy -1.8 -1.8 
  Net Domestic Product 142.2 152.4 10.2 7.2
Net Factor Payments -29.0 -30.9 -1.9 6.6 
National Income 113.2 121.5 8.3 7.3 
Depreciation 24.0 24.5 0.5 2.1 
GNP at Factor Cost 137.2 146.0 8.8 6.4 
Taxes less Subsidies 18.1 18.8 0.7 3.7 
GNP at Market Prices 155.4 164.8 9.5 6.1 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2014 2015 Change in 2015 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X - M 39.9 43.5 3.6 
F -29.0 -30.9 -1.9 
Net Transfers -2.5 -2.5 0.0 
Balance on Current Account 8.5 10.1 1.7 
as % of GNP 5.4 6.2 1.0 
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1
The International Economy 
 
Since the last Commentary, the United States and United Kingdom have 
continued to grow robustly. In these economies, discussion has seen the return of 
monetary policy to more normal settings, after a prolonged period of very low 
interest rates and of substantial asset purchases. With declining spare capacity, 
particularly in the US, inflationary pressures are set to return. The European 
economy is markedly different. It faces stagnation in growth with very low 
inflation, and outright deflation in some countries. Thus while the outlook for two 
of Ireland’s main trade partners is conducive to export growth, we have lowered 
our export forecast due to the ongoing difficulties concerning European economic 
performance. 
 
FIGURE 1 Real GDP Growth (% Change, Year-on-Year)
 
 Euro Area   United States    United Kingdom 
       
 
 
Sources:  FocusEconomics, IMF, OECD, HM Treasury and Federal Reserve. 
 
The Euro Area Economy 
Real GDP in the Euro Area grew by 0.2 per cent quarter-on-quarter and by 0.8 per 
cent year-on-year in the third quarter of 2014. The fact that the bloc narrowly 
avoided falling back into recession should not be mistaken for a success. Whether 
the growth rate proved to be slightly above, or slightly below, zero is not of 
particular importance. In practical terms, the Euro Area remains in a downturn 
Actual outturn Forecast range Actual outturn and median of forecasts
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which started in 2008, and now appears to be on the verge of stagnation. It faces 
low growth and low inflation, with policy responses proving to be slow and, as 
yet, insufficient.  
 
Nowcasts1 suggest Euro Area growth of 0.01 per cent in the fourth quarter of 
2014. For France, Germany and Italy they estimate growth of 0.2 per cent, 0.1 per 
cent and -0.2 per cent respectively. As argued in previous Commentaries, an 
investment programme for Europe would help to stimulate growth. A practicable 
plan does not seem to be forthcoming, however. Germany, a country with 
sufficient “fiscal space” to pursue investment, in the words of European Central 
Bank (ECB) President Mario Draghi, has announced its intentions to pursue a 
balanced budget instead. The European Commission, under newly-elected 
President Jean-Claude Juncker, has produced a €315 billion investment plan, 
aspects of which have already drawn heavy criticism. The plan has an ambitious 
official leverage ratio of 15; the total announced figure is the sum of €21 billion in 
European funds and a target for attracting supplementary private funds. 
However, the details of the plan reveal that the European funds are guarantees 
rather than cash and include some previously-announced guarantees. It is also 
possible that the selection of investment projects could be problematic, being 
limited to infrastructure projects from which private gains could be realised. 
 
Meanwhile, inflation as measured in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices 
(HICP) in the Euro Area was 0.3 per cent in November. Core inflation, excluding 
energy, food, alcohol and tobacco, was stable at 0.7 per cent in November. A 
further issue arises from the possibility of inflation expectations de-anchoring 
from the ECB’s inflation target of just under 2 per cent. In August, the ECB’s 
preferred indicator of medium-term inflation expectations, the 5Y5Y Inflation 
Forward Swap Rate, fell below 2 per cent for the first time since 2011. It remains 
at approximately 1.6 per cent in November. The ECB recently cut its inflation rate 
forecasts for 2015 and 2016 to 0.7 per cent and 1.3 per cent respectively, before 
fully taking into account the recent decline in oil prices. The unemployment rate 
in the Euro Area was stable at 11.5 per cent in October, as a result of reductions 
in unemployment in some states being offset by an increase in Italy from 12.9 per 
cent to a record 13.2 per cent.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1  Now-Casting.com, November 2014. 
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As discussed in previous Commentaries, the ECB has introduced new policy 
measures to return inflation to target and to stimulate growth. These have 
included cuts to interest rates and the expansion of the ECB’s balance sheet 
through asset purchases. In November, ECB President Mario Draghi stated that 
the inclusion of government bonds as part of the ECB’s asset purchase 
programme would fall within the ECB’s mandate. In addition he stated that staff 
had been tasked with the preparation of further measures, which the ECB would 
be ready to introduce, if the previously-announced measures are insufficient. 
 
The US Economy 
The advanced estimate of third quarter growth in the United States shows that 
real GDP grew by an annualised 3.9 per cent, following growth of 4.6 per cent in 
the previous quarter. There was growth in private consumer expenditure, 
investment, exports and government expenditure, while inventory investment 
and imports fell. GDP growth in the second and third quarters represent the 
strongest six months of growth in the US in the last decade. It is worth noting, 
however, that the second quarter growth rate may have involved an element of 
rebounding from a weather-hit first quarter which proved to be surprisingly 
weak. 
 
The unemployment rate in the United States was unchanged at 5.8 per cent in 
November. It had been 7.0 per cent in November 2013, and the unemployment 
rate has now fallen to pre-crisis levels. Employment grew by 320,000 in 
November, the largest monthly increase since January 2012. While the labour 
force participation rate remains at historic lows, it appears that the problem of 
under-utilisation of labour has eased somewhat. There were falls in some wider 
measures of unemployment which incorporate discouraged workers or those 
marginally attached to the labour force. The number of long-term unemployed 
also fell by 1.2 million year-on-year to 2.8 million. 
 
After more than five years, the Federal Reserve ended its $4.5 trillion asset 
purchase programme in October. At its October meeting, it also revised its policy 
outlook to reflect the possibility of raising interest rates in the first half of 2015. 
Given the relatively strong nature of the US recovery, and diminishing spare 
capacity, it appears likely that the target for the Federal Funds Rate will rise from 
its current window of 0 to 0.25 per cent relatively soon. Inflation rose by 1.7 per 
cent annually in October, factoring in a fall of 1.6 per cent in energy prices. 
 
4|  Q ua rt er ly  Econom ic  Comme nt ary  –  Wi nt e r  2 014  
 
The UK Economy 
Real GDP in the United Kingdom grew by 0.7 per cent quarter-on-quarter in Q3 
and by 3 per cent compared with the same quarter of 2013, according to the 
Office for National Statistics. Growth from the second quarter was revised up to 
0.9 per cent. Recent historical revisions to the UK’s National Accounts reduced 
the size of the peak-to-trough loss in output during the crisis to 6 per cent. UK 
output is now estimated to exceed the pre-crisis peak by 3.4 per cent. Questions 
remain about how balanced the recovery is, however; the majority of growth has 
come from the domestic economy with little contribution from trade. 
Consumption growth is the largest contributor and is primarily debt-fuelled given 
the lack of increase in wages. The UK’s trade deficit also widened in the third 
quarter, while growth in industrial production was revised down from 0.5 per 
cent to 0.2 per cent. Growth in services of 0.7 per cent again represented the 
biggest contribution to GDP growth. 
 
The unemployment rate fell to 6 per cent in the third quarter, from 6.3 per cent 
the previous quarter and from 7.6 per cent the previous year. The participation 
rate in the UK has remained roughly constant over the last year, with 22.2 per 
cent of the working age population inactive. Thus, the fall in unemployment is in 
large part attributable to increasing employment. The employment rate rose to 
73 per cent in Q3 from 71.6 per cent in the same quarter last year. Real wages 
continued to fall in the UK, with inflation of 1.3 per cent outweighing the growth 
of 1 per cent in nominal wages.  
 
It appears unlikely that the Bank of England will increase interest rates in the first 
half of 2015, in contrast to expectations for the Federal Reserve. Inflation in the 
UK is on a downward trend attributable to falling oil prices and subdued wage 
pressures. A slight interruption in that trend during October has been put down 
to one-off factors. As part of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Framework, 
the Governor is required to send an open letter to the Chancellor to explain a 
deviation from the inflation target of 1 percentage point in either direction. This 
would be triggered in November 2014 if the forecast for 1 per cent annual 
inflation in that month should come to pass.  
 
The World Economy 
In December, the price of crude oil fell to US$66 a barrel, a four-year low, 
following OPEC’s announcement that it would not reduce supply until the second 
half of 2015, at the earliest. Oil prices have fallen 45 per cent since June. Crude oil 
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supply has been growing while demand has been weak globally, resulting in 
falling prices and an increase in crude oil inventories. As has been noted in recent 
Commentaries, energy prices have been contributing to falling levels of inflation 
in the Euro Area, the US and the UK. Based on these forecasts, this is likely to 
continue to be the case. The majority of oil-producing countries require the oil 
price to be significantly higher than its current level to balance their budgets, with 
countries such as Venezuela and Russia particularly affected. 
 
The latest Global Economic Forecast from the UK’s National Institute of Economic 
and Social Research revised down its forecast of world GDP growth to 3.3 per 
cent in 2014 and 3.5 per cent in 2015. It focuses on the worsening situation in the 
Euro Area and “policy gridlock” in response. Among emerging markets, Brazil 
entered recession in the first half of 2014, while growth in China continues to 
slow down. 
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2 
Growth, Output and Investment 
 
Over the course of 2014 we have seen some rebalancing in the drivers of 
economic growth in Ireland, with domestic demand starting to make a 
contribution to growth. This reflects increases in personal consumption and 
particularly stronger growth in investment than had previously been anticipated. 
It now seems likely that real GDP growth will be 4.9 per cent in 2014 with real 
GNP growing at a similar rate. We expect strong growth again in 2015, driven by a 
similar set of factors. However, our earlier forecast for Irish economic growth in 
2015 has been revised down to 4.6 per cent in GNP terms and 4.7 per cent for 
GDP. Based on our forecasts it seems likely that the growth in final demand will 
be similar to the growth expected for GNP in both 2014 and 2015. The improving 
performance of the domestic economy is expected to be reflected in domestic 
demand growth of 3.7 per cent in 2014 and 4 per cent in 2015.  
 
The Department of Finance in material accompanying the Budget, and the Irish 
Fiscal Advisory Council in its recent report, drew attention to the issue of how 
“contract manufacturing”2 may be flattering recent growth in GDP. This, along 
with other national accounting issues, has been the subject of much analysis in 
recent Commentaries. While our focus both on GNP and the terms of trade may 
not completely address these issues, using these indicators does help to mitigate 
somewhat the impact of these anomalies in achieving an accurate assessment of 
Irish economic developments. 
 
Data from the Central Statistics Office (CSO) show that output across a range of 
sectors of the economy has continued to increase in the third quarter. Taking 
these indicators into account means that we are forecasting output growth of 4.5 
per cent this year and 5 per cent in 2015. The pick-up in activity in general, 
coupled with an increase in construction output, is reflected in stronger growth in 
gross value added from the Industrial sector in 2015. As has been the case in 
recent years, growth in Service sector output will be an important driver of 
activity levels in the economy. We expect that the output from the combined 
Distribution, Transport, Software and Communications sectors could increase by 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2  Contract manufacturing occurs where an Irish resident firm (but not necessarily an Irish-owned one) contracts a 
manufacturer abroad to produce a good for supply to an end client abroad. The sale of the good is recorded as an 
Irish export of goods, while the contracted production is considered a service import. 
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9 per cent in 2015, while output from other services is forecast to grow by close 
to 3 per cent. 
 
TABLE 1 Industry and Output
 
 
2012 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
Value Volume Change 
 
€ bn % % % % 
Agriculture 3.8 -12.6 16.5 10.0 7.0 
Industry 39.6 -2.1 -2.3 1.3 3.0 
Distribution, Transport, Software 
and Communications 41.0 1.0 -5.2 10.0 9.0 
Public Administration and Defence 6.5 -2.6 -2.2 1.5 2.0 
Other Services 65.7 2.7 2.4 2.4 2.9 
GVA at Factor Cost 157.5 -0.5 -0.4 4.5 5.0 
Source:  ESRI Forecasts. 
 
Available indicators continue to point to strong growth in investment in the Irish 
economy during 2014. However, it now seems likely that the number of private 
house completions this year and next will be marginally lower than we had 
previously anticipated. Taking account of the recently announced investment in 
social housing our forecast completions for 2015 is 16,000. As we have previously 
discussed, this is below the forecast rate of new household formation and so 
points to a continuing gap between the demand for and supply of housing over 
the forecast period. Other building and construction output is also expected to 
increase, reflecting higher domestic activity levels and increased FDI flows. These 
factors, as well as the undertaking of previously deferred investment, will also 
underpin growth in machinery and equipment investment, both in 2014 and 
2015. On the basis of this, we expect that overall investment will grow by 14.3 
per cent this year and by 12.8 per cent in volume terms in 2015.  
 
TABLE 2 Gross Fixed Capital Formation
 
 
2012 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
Value Volume Change 
 
€ bn % % % % 
Housing 3.0 -22.6 3.5 5.5 24.3 
Other Building 6.0 12.7 18.3 26.5 18.6 
Total Building and Construction 9.4 -1.5 14.1 19.9 19.7 
Machinery and Equipment 17.6 8.8 -11.2 10.6 7.7 
GVA at Factor Cost 26.9 5.0 -2.4 14.3 12.8 
Source:  ESRI Forecasts. 
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3
The Labour Market, Earnings, Prices and Consumption 
 
The Labour Market 
Given the continued improvements in overall economic activity, employment 
grew by 1.5 per cent in the year to Q3 2014. On a seasonally-adjusted basis, the 
Live Register recorded a standardised unemployment rate of 10.7 per cent in 
November, down from 10.9 per cent one month previous. Although the Live 
Register is not designed to measure unemployment, this rate mirrors that of the 
official measure from the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) for Q3 
2014 of 11.1 per cent. This is the ninth quarter in succession (since Q1 2013) that 
unemployment has declined on an annual basis. Since June 2014 the number of 
persons classified as long-term unemployed has also continued to fall with a 
decrease of 15.7 per cent in the year to Q3 2014. 
 
The overall employment rate among persons aged 15-64 now stands at 62.2 per 
cent compared to 61.1 per cent in Q3 2013. Employment increased in ten of the 
14 economic sectors over the year with the largest rate of increase recorded in 
Construction which is up 6.7 per cent annually and 3.8 per cent quarterly. It is 
worth noting that employment in Construction is still 60 per cent below the peak 
reached in Q2 2007. The majority of new jobs created continue to be full-time 
positions, with an increase of 1.8 per cent over the year following an annual 
increase of 2.4 per cent in Q2 2014. 
 
The total number of persons in the labour force in the third quarter of 2014 
decreased by 0.1 per cent compared to the second quarter. This follows 0.4 per 
cent quarter-on-quarter fall in the labour force in Q2 and a 0.3 per cent quarter-
on-quarter decline in Q1 2014. Overall, the participation rate is up 0.1 per cent 
this quarter, compared to both Q1 and Q2 when falls were recorded. 
 
Table 3 outlines the labour market forecasts for the remainder of 2014 and 2015. 
Based on the results from the most recent QNHS and our overall assessment of 
the economy, we forecast increases in the total number at work in 2014 and 
2015. The unemployment rate will decrease further this year, and we forecast a 
rate of 9.7 per cent for 2015. We anticipate that growth in both external demand 
and in investment will continue to drive employment in both the Services and 
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  W i nt er  201 4 |  9  
 
 
 
Construction sectors. It is worth noting the labour-intensive nature of the 
Construction sector, thus, any significant pick-up in activity will have a sizable 
impact on unemployment rates.  The decrease in net migration between 2014 
and 2015 is primarily due to the forecast growth in employment. 
 
TABLE 3 Employment, Unemployment and Net Migration
 
 Annual Averages, 000s 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Agriculture 86 107 110 110 
Industry 336 342 347 368 
  of which: Construction 102 102 109 118 
Services 1,421 1,431 1,453 1,485 
     
Total at work 1,842 1,880 1,913 1,962 
Employment Growth Rate, % -0.7 2.0 1.8 2.6 
     
Unemployed 316 282 244 210 
Labour Force 2,154 2,163 2,157 2,172 
Unemployment Rate, % 14.7 13.0 11.3 9.7 
Participation Rate, % 59.9 60.2 60.0 60.5 
     
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
 
Earnings 
Preliminary estimates from the CSO on Earnings and Labour Costs for Q3 2014 
reveal that Average Hourly Earnings continue to decrease and are down a further 
1.4 per cent over the year. This compares with a revised decrease of 2.2 per cent 
in Average Hourly Earnings in the year to Q2 2014 from €22.01 to €21.53 per 
hour. 
 
In the year to Q3 2014 Average Hourly Earnings have increased in five of the 14 
sectors. The largest percentage increase was recorded in the Industry sector, up 2 
per cent while the largest percentage decrease in Average Hourly Earnings was 
recorded in the Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities sector, down 6.1 
per cent. 
 
The estimated number of persons employed in the public sector showed a 
reduction of 1.6 per cent over the year to Q3 2014 with the largest percentage 
decrease recorded in the Health sector (3.7 per cent). As in previous 
Commentaries, we assume that the falling numbers in the public sector may help 
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to explain the aforementioned falling Average Hourly Earnings. If those leaving 
employment earned above the average wage then this change in the composition 
of the public sector workforce would inevitably lower the average earnings in this 
sector. 
 
We forecast growth in average earnings of 1 per cent for 2015. It is worth noting 
that in the case of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing estimates of employment are 
sensitive to sample changes over time. This is a result of the incremental 
introduction of the new sample based on the 2011 Census of Population over the 
period Q4 2012 to Q4 2013.3 Some caution is warranted in the interpretation of 
trends involving the period of its introduction as it lowers non-agricultural 
employment growth, raising our average earnings forecast. We forecast current 
transfers (social welfare payments) to fall in 2014 and 2015, in line with the 
continued increase in employment as well an increase in current disposable 
income in both years. 
 
TABLE 4 Personal Disposable Income
 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 € bn € bn € bn € bn 
Agriculture etc. 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.2 
Non-Agricultural Wages 69.5 71.9 73.1 75.8 
Other Non-Agricultural Income 14.3 15.2 17.4 19.9 
     
Total Income Received 86.9 90.1 93.5 98.9 
Current Transfers 25.1 24.5 24.1 23.7 
Gross Personal Income 111.9 114.6 117.6 122.6 
Direct Personal Taxes 24.5 25.3 27.0 28.0 
     
Personal Disposable Income 87.4 89.3 90.6 94.6 
Consumption 82.5 83.3 85.0 87.6 
Personal Savings 4.9 5.9 5.6 7.0 
Savings Ratio 5.6 6.6 6.1 7.4 
Average Tax Rate (%) 21.9 22.0 22.9 22.7 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3  See Conefrey, T. and Linehan, S., “Recent Employment Recovery,” Central Bank of Ireland Quarterly Bulletin Q2, April 
2014. 
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Prices 
In October, annual inflation in Ireland fell to 0.2 per cent according to the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) and to 0.4 per cent when measured by the 
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). CPI core inflation, excluding Energy 
and Unprocessed Food, was 0.5 per cent however, reflecting the impact of falling 
energy prices discussed in Chapter 1. Inflation in Ireland is also affected by falling 
mortgage interest payments; excluding these, the inflation rate was 0.8 per cent 
year-on-year in October. The prevalence of tracker mortgages in Ireland has 
meant the reductions in the ECB policy rate have resulted in lower mortgage 
payments for Irish households. Recently, Allied Irish Bank (AIB) decided to also 
pass through a rate reduction to its variable rate mortgage holders. 
 
The Residential Property Price Index, on the other hand, has seen double-digit 
rates of inflation in recent months. Nationally, house prices rose by 16.3 per cent 
annually in October, while in Dublin they rose by 24.2 per cent.  The CPI also 
showed that private rents also rose by 8.9 per cent in the year to October. 
 
Our forecasts for the CPI, HICP and Personal Consumption Deflator for 2014 and 
2015 are set out in Table 5. We expect inflation to remain low in Ireland in 2015 
but to rise slightly compared with 2014. 
 
TABLE 5 Inflation Measures
 
  2012 2013 2014 2015 
  Annual Change 
  % % % % 
CPI 1.7 0.5 0.3 0.5 
Personal Consumption Deflator 0.6 1.7 0.5 1.0 
HICP 1.9 0.5 0.4 0.6 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
 
Consumption 
Retail sales rose by 5.6 per cent in volume terms year-on-year in October 2014. 
There has been annual volume growth in excess of 5 per cent in each month this 
year, while October 2013 was the last month to register an annual volume fall in 
sales. Retail sales grew by 4.6 per cent annually in October when car sales are 
excluded from the total. Car sales have provided a large contribution to the 
growth in retail sales in 2014; 89,915 new private cars were licensed in the first 
ten months of 2014, a 29.6 per cent increase over the same period in 2013. In 
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addition, there has been a 48.4 per cent increase in the licensing of new goods 
vehicles. In 2014 there has also been a 7.8 per cent increase in the licensing of 
second-hand (imported) private cars and a 24.8 per cent increase in second-hand 
goods vehicles. 
 
The three-month moving average of the KBC Ireland/ESRI Consumer Sentiment 
Index fell slightly in November and October. The November value of 87.9 for the 
moving average compares with values of 73.4 in November 2013 and 61.6 in 
November 2012, however. There has been a consistent trend towards an increase 
in consumer confidence over the last two years. The sub-indices which examine 
perceptions of the current state of the economy and expectations for future 
developments have also consistently risen over this period. 
 
Our outlook for private consumption is still conditioned somewhat by the 
relatively high levels of household debt still prevalent in the Irish economy. 
Consequently, some amount of deleveraging is still set to occur as households 
continue to repair their impaired balance sheets. Therefore, we expect growth in 
private consumption of 1.5 and 2.0 per cent in 2014 and 2015 respectively.  
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4
Exports, Imports and the Balance of Payments 
 
Both exports and imports of goods were down by 4 per cent (in volume terms) in 
September 2014 from the previous month. Overall, however, the value of goods 
exports increased by 8 per cent in the year to September 2014, while imports 
over the same period increased by 10 per cent.  
 
Much of the annual growth in goods exports has been driven by increases in 
Medical and Pharmaceutical products (22 per cent) and Essential Oils (25 per 
cent) which is further confirmation of the strong role played by the 
Pharmaceutical sector in the export led recovery. While the Investec Purchasing 
Managers’ Index continued to increase in November, indicating a broad 
improvement in conditions across much of the Irish economy, the sub-index 
measuring new services exports fell to a five-month low of 60.0 from 60.6 a 
month earlier. The main drivers behind the annual growth in goods imports are 
Petroleum and related products which increased by 40 per cent and Machinery 
Specialised for Particular Industries which grew by 148 per cent. 
 
FIGURE 2 Proportion of Total Exports to UK, USA and Canada and Other EU Member States (%)
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Figure 2 plots the proportion of total Irish exports to the United States and 
Canada, the United Kingdom and Other EU Member States. As noted in Chapter 
1, the outlook for the US and UK is quite positive and provides an added boost for 
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Irish exporters. Exports to the US, in particular, have continued to strengthen 
which may be linked to the issue of “contract manufacturing”, discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 2. Despite the fact that goods exports to the US are down 
almost 20 per cent quarter-on-quarter, overall there has been growth in this 
market of over 4 per cent for the period January to September 2014 compared 
with the same period in 2013.  
 
The outlook for European growth is somewhat different and this constitutes one 
of the most significant risks to Irish growth in 2015. As can be seen from Figure 2, 
a significantly higher proportion of Irish exports go to European as opposed to UK 
or US destinations. For example, in the first nine months of 2014 exports to the 
Euro Area are down almost 4 per cent compared to the same period in 2013. As 
noted in Chapter 1, growth prospects for the Euro Area are an increasing 
concern, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) now estimating a 40 per 
cent probability that the currency union will slip into recession for the third time 
since the financial crisis.  
 
We anticipate that the slowdown in the Euro Area will have some impact on 
Ireland’s exports in 2015. We forecast growth in merchandise exports of 7.5 per 
cent in 2014 and 7 per cent in 2015. We also forecast total services exports to 
grow by 3.6 per cent this year and 3 per cent in 2015. Overall, however, we 
believe the volume of total exports will increase by 5.6 per cent in 2014 and 5.1 
per cent in 2015. 
 
TABLE 6 Exports of Goods and Services
 
 2012 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
Value Volume Change 
 
€ bn % % % % 
Merchandise 97.1 1.0 -4.1 7.5 7.0 
Services:      
   Tourism 3.0 -3.3 10.6 4.0 3.4 
   Other Services 82.5 1.2 6.9 3.6 3.0 
Total Services 85.5 9.2 7.0 3.6 3.0 
Exports of Goods and Services 182.5 4.7 1.1 5.6 5.1 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
 
Previous Commentaries have noted difficulties with the interpretation of Irish 
trade data. This is a particular issue for imports at the moment owing to the 
substantial aircraft purchases by Ryanair. In September 2014, Ryanair began 
importing 180 new planes which will, over time, add between €1 and €1.5 billion 
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to the national import. These issues are taken into account in our forecasts and 
we expect growth of 4.5 per cent in the volume of imports for 2014 and 2015. 
 
TABLE 7 Imports of Goods and Services
 
 2012 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Value Volume Change 
 € bn % % % % 
Merchandise 54.6 7.0 3.7 7.2 7.2 
Services      
    Tourism 4.6 -7.1 0.5 1.2 1.2 
    Other Services 87.9 8.9 -1.3 2.8 2.8 
Total Services 92.5 6.8 -1.2 2.7 2.7 
Imports of Goods and Services 147.1 6.9 0.6 4.5 4.5 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
 
A Balance of Payments current account surplus of 6.3 per cent of GDP was 
recorded in Q2 2014. In 2014 and 2015 we envisage a further improvement in the 
current account surplus at 5.4 per cent of GNP in 2014 and 6.2 per cent of GNP in 
2015. When account is taken of the redomiciled PLCs4 (an issue commented upon 
extensively in the Autumn Commentary) the current account surplus is forecast 
to be 0.7 per cent of GNP in 2014 and 1.7 per cent in 2015. Therefore, 
notwithstanding the growing relevance of domestic considerations such as 
investment and consumption over the next year, net foreign demand is expected 
to continue to be a cornerstone of future growth in the Irish economy. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
4  Over the last few years a number of companies have relocated their headquarters to Ireland without generating any 
real activity in the economy in terms of employment or purchases of domestic inputs.  These companies, referred to 
technically as redomiciled PLCs, hold major investments elsewhere in the world but they have established a legal 
presence in Ireland. This means that their profits are paid to them in Ireland even though, under double taxation 
agreements, their tax liability arises in other jurisdictions.  
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5
Public Finances 
 
A feature of the strong performance of the Irish economy in 2014 has been the 
consistent, better than expected, returns across all of the main taxation 
categories. Figure 3 shows the cumulative differences between receipts in 2014 
and 2013 for Social Insurance Contributions and the three largest tax headings, 
Income Tax, Value-Added Tax and Excise Duty. The improvement in returns 
through 2014 is clearly evident. Overall, by end-November 2014, total taxation 
receipts were €38.2 billion, an increase of 8.5 per cent or approximately €3 
billion, compared with the first 11 months of 2013. The significant economic 
growth forecasts in Commentaries to date in 2014 have been underpinned by the 
evidence of an increasing rate of taxation receipts.  
 
The increasing rate of taxation receipts has been one of the key factors 
underpinning the significant growth rates in the economy forecast in the 
Commentaries to date in 2014. 
 
FIGURE 3 Year-on-year Changes in Receipts for Key Taxation Items
 
 
Source:  Department of Finance.  
Notes:  Receipts are cumulative to the given month. Social Insurance Contributions include PRSI and NTF. 
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Reasons for Strong Tax Performance in 2014 
The increased rate of car sales through 2014 is one of the likely reasons for the 
strong performance in VAT returns, which are €600 million higher in 2014 than 
2013. Positive developments in the labour market are responsible for the 
relatively high returns in Income Tax and Social Insurance Contributions. This 
relationship is particularly strong for the latter item. As Figure 3 shows, income 
tax receipts are approximately €1.3 billion higher thus far in 2014, while Social 
Insurance Contributions have increased by €400 million.  
 
TABLE 8 Public Finances
 
 2013 2014 2014 2015 2015 
 €bn €bn % change €bn % change 
Income      
Taxes on income incl. Social insurance 30.5 32.1 5.3 33.4 4.0 
Taxes on expenditure 19.0 20.9 9.8 21.8 4.4 
Gross trading and investment income 4.0 3.3 -15.6 3.1 -6.7 
Other Income 3.4 3.1 -8.1 3.2 1.9 
Total receipts: Current 56.9 59.5 4.5 61.6 3.5 
Total receipts: Capital 0.5 0.6 18.7 0.7 15.6 
Total receipts: Current and Capital 57.5 60.1 4.7 62.3 3.6 
Expenditure      
Subsidies 1.5 1.6 3.8 1.8 16.0 
National debt interest 7.7 7.5 -2.4 7.4 -1.3 
Transfer payments 28.2 27.8 -1.5 27.4 -1.3 
Expenditure on Goods and Services 26.7 26.1 -2.0 26.3 0.8 
Total expenditure: Current 64.1 63.0 -1.7 63.0 0.0 
Total expenditure: Capital 3.4 3.7 8.5 4.1 10.7 
Total expenditure: Current and Capital    67.5 66.7 -1.2 67.1 0.6 
General Govt. Balance -10.0 -6.5  -4.7  
As % of GDP -5.7 -3.5  -2.4  
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
 
In terms of the outlook for different taxation items in 2015, one key issue is likely 
to be the performance of the Property sector. Addison-Smyth and McQuinn 
(2010)5 demonstrated a strong link between the housing components of VAT, 
Capital Gains Tax (CGT) and stamp duties and key housing indicators such as 
prices and supply levels. Given the price increases forecast in McQuinn (2014),6 
and the improved outlook for housing supply expected in 2015, these taxation 
items could also see significant growth in 2015. Table 8 contains our forecasts for 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
5  Addison-Smyth, D. and McQuinn, K. (2010). “Quantifying Revenue Windfalls from the Irish Housing Market”, The 
Economic and Social Review, Economic and Social Studies, vol. 41(2), pp. 201-233. 
6  McQuinn, K. (2014). “Bubble, Bubble Toil and Trouble? An Assessment of the Current State of the Irish Housing 
Market”, Special Article in Quarterly Economic Commentary, Summer 2014. 
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the public finances in 2015. Total receipts are forecast to grow by 3.6 per cent, 
with taxes on income growing by 4 per cent. 
 
In terms of expenditure, the total cost to the Exchequer of servicing the national 
debt was €7,385 million at end-October 2014, constituting a year-on-year 
increase of €178 million or 2.5 per cent. Interest expenditure, which is the largest 
component of debt servicing costs, was 5.7 per cent below the Budget 2014 
consistent profile at end-October 2014. This is primarily due to the December 
2013 bond buy-back which resulted in lower interest expenditure in the early part 
of 2014, lower than expected costs from bond issuance so far this year, and a 
favourable rate reset on the floating rate bonds post-Budget last December. 
Transfer payments are forecast to fall by 1.3 per cent in 2015 due to continued 
labour market recovery. 
 
Budgetary Changes 
The Autumn Commentary suggested a neutral fiscal budget. This, we felt, struck 
the right balance between the need to maintain fiscal discipline and in particular 
meet the 3 per cent deficit target in 2015 with the clear need to encourage and 
foster the recovery in the economy. We advocated an increase in capital 
expenditure on social housing of approximately €500 million, which we projected 
would be offset by the increase in water charges set to be imposed in 2015. 
While there was a specific commitment to social housing in the measures 
announced, most of the budgetary changes introduced consisted of reforms to 
the taxation system. This strategy is somewhat questionable given that the 
economy is still spending more than it is taking in revenue. It now appears that 
the budget was stimulatory to the tune of approximately €1 billion.  
 
The revenue impact of water charges is now likely to be less positive than 
previously expected. Lower revenues from water charges must be offset by a 
compensatory increased subvention from the Exchequer, as can be seen in the 
forecast increase in subsidies in Table 8. As a result of these expenditure 
increases, we have revised our forecast deficit for 2015 to 2.4 per cent of GDP, 
from a forecast 2.1 per cent in our Autumn Commentary. Irish Water is also set to 
face a market capitalisation test from the European Commission. If it fails to 
receive at least 50 per cent of its revenue from private sources, its borrowing 
must be included in the General Government Deficit, which poses a further risk to 
the 2015 deficit forecast.  
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6
Monetary and Financial Sector Developments 
 
Stress Testing 
The results of the Comprehensive Assessment (CA) carried out by the ECB were 
released in late October 2014. The assessment comprised three distinct elements 
(i) an asset quality review, followed by (ii) a supervisory risk adjustment and 
finally (iii) a stress test. The objective of such an assessment was to enhance the 
transparency of European banks and to implement necessary corrective actions if 
required.  
 
The stress test examined the resilience of all banks against two separate 
scenarios; a baseline and an adverse scenario, starting in 2014 and running to the 
end of 2016. Under both scenarios, the solvency ratio of each bank was analysed 
over the period to understand bank sensitivities given prescribed stressed 
economic conditions. The baseline scenario was provided by the European 
Commission and reflected the then-prevailing official macroeconomic forecasts 
while the adverse scenario represented a severe economic downturn triggered by 
a materialisation of the main economic risks identified by the European Systemic 
Risk Board.  
 
From an Irish perspective, Permanent TSB was the only institution to fail the 
stress test under the adverse scenario. All other Irish banks included in the 
assessment - Bank of Ireland, AIB and Ulster Bank, for example - passed every 
aspect of the assessment. These results were anticipated in the Autumn 
Commentary given the improvements observed in house prices over the past 18 
months. The increase in house prices observed has strengthened the mortgage 
section of Irish institutions’ balance sheets. 
 
While Permanent TSB passed the baseline scenario, it failed under the adverse 
scenario of the stress test at the end of 2016 leaving it with a minimum capital 
shortfall of €855 million. The bank claims that it has covered 80 per cent of this 
capital hole and indicates that it will raise the remaining capital from private 
investors. Of the 25 European banks that failed the CA, 13 will need to raise €25 
billion of new capital. The remaining 12 banks have already covered their 
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shortfalls, raising more than €55 billion of new capital in the period since the 
tests were conducted.  
 
In terms of evaluating the success or otherwise of the CA, some concerns have 
been expressed about the assumptions underpinning the results of the stress 
test. For example, in the adverse scenario, the outlook for both inflation and 
growth at 1.0 per cent and 1.2 per cent per annum looks very optimistic at this 
stage with no real allowance made in the analysis for the possibility of deflation. 
Secondly the sovereign bond yield rises in the “adverse scenario” are far smaller 
than the yield spikes seen in the Euro Area periphery during and in the immediate 
aftermath of the financial crisis. 
 
The major issue facing the Euro Area is to what extent the results of the stress 
tests will help to increase bank lending to the real economy. There is some 
suspicion that banks, owing to the prospect of the stress tests and the need for 
more capital, were reluctant to lend over the past year. Therefore, with banks 
passing the tests, this may increase lending to some extent. However, the asset 
quality review component of the CA has demonstrated that European banks still 
have nearly €1 trillion of non-performing loans on their balance sheets, which 
inevitably ties up capital, thereby restricting lending capacity. Therefore any 
significant impact of financial intermediation on European growth is likely to be 
some way off. 
 
The assessment by the European Banking Authority (EBA) was imposed with the 
intention of providing clarity about the health of the banking system in 
preparation for the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) which became fully 
operational in early November. The SSM is a system of financial supervision 
comprising the ECB and the national competent authorities of each participating 
EU country.  
 
The Euro Area’s 120 largest institutions have been categorised into significant 
institutions and less significant institutions, constituting a further step towards 
the integration of the European Banking sector. For significant institutions, 
including the larger banks operating within Ireland, for example AIB, Bank of 
Ireland, Permanent TSB, KBC, Ulster Bank and Rabobank, a Joint Supervisory 
Team, led by the ECB and consisting of both ECB and Central Bank supervisors, 
will directly supervise these firms.  
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Macro-Prudential 
In early October the Central Bank proposed the introduction of restrictions on 
Loan-to-Income (LTI) and Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratios for Irish residential 
mortgages. The potential application of macro-prudential measures in the Irish 
property market is a welcome development since sharp increases in the supply of 
mortgage credit over the period 2003 - 2007 was almost certainly to blame for 
the Irish property boom and subsequent bust.  
 
The purpose of an LTV restriction is to impose a requirement for borrowers to 
provide a minimum level of deposit based upon the value of the property. This 
type of policy is intended to make lenders less vulnerable in the event of property 
prices falling by reducing the losses in the event of a default. The Bank has 
proposed that a maximum of 15 per cent of loans should have LTVs in excess of 
80 per cent. On the other hand, the aim of introducing an LTI limit is to reduce 
the risk of a borrower defaulting on a loan due to a loss of income. As such, it has 
proposed that a maximum of 20 per cent of loans should have LTI ratios greater 
than 3.5.   
 
The Appendix to the Commentary sets out the submission by Duffy and McQuinn 
to the consultation process which appraises these proposed measures. In 
particular, the submission notes the necessity for a “counter-cyclical” rules-based 
approach to be employed in the application of these macro-prudential measures. 
This, it argues, is in the interests of transparency for market participants and 
efficacy of policy implementation. Furthermore, Duffy and McQuinn argue that 
were such a rule in place at present it is unlikely it would suggest the imposition 
of the proposed measures at this time. As noted in Duffy (2013)7 such rules-based 
systems have operated for some time in property markets such as Hong Kong. 
 
Credit Risk and Extension 
The level of mortgage arrears remains a cause for concern this quarter despite 
the fact that the number of mortgage accounts for principal dwelling houses 
(PDH) in arrears continues to decline. This is, however, masking the increasing 
number of PDHs that are now in arrears over 720 days. In terms of buy-to-let 
(BTL) mortgages, accounts in arrears of over 90 days increased during the first 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
7  Duffy D. (2013). “Should Loan-to-Value Ratios be Limited?  The International Evidence”, in Using Evidence to Inform 
Policy, Lunn, P. and Ruane, F. eds., Gill and McMillian. 
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nine months of 2014, with a more pronounced increase among those accounts in 
arrears of over 720 days.  
  
Household loan draw-downs exceeded repayments by €68 million during 
September 2014. This is the first month since September 2013 and only the third 
month since the end of 2009 that loan draw-downs have exceeded repayments. 
In the case of loans for house purchase, draw-downs exceeded repayments by €8 
million during September, the first positive number since June 2013. However, 
repayments have exceeded draw-downs for house purchase by €1.8 billion for 
the year to date.  
 
Non-financial corporation (NFC) loan repayments exceeded draw-downs by €514 
million in September 2014 following a net decline of €367 million in August. 
Lending to Irish resident NFCs reported a year-on-year decline of 9.1 per cent in 
September 2014, following an annual decrease of 8.4 per cent in August.  
 
Irish Sovereign Bond Yields 
The Irish Government 10-year bond yield decreased to 1.56 per cent in November 
from 1.73 per cent in October, a significant drop from the record 14.22 per cent 
recorded in July 2011. Sentiment towards Irish bonds has been further improved 
in recent months by the prospect of the ECB buying securities to boost growth in 
the Euro Area economy and speed up inflation.   
 
In light of these record low yields, the sovereign launched a 15-year debt sale in 
early November, raising money to repay part of its bailout loans from the IMF. 
The sale was Ireland’s longest bond offering since it exited the Troika (European 
Union and IMF) bailout a year ago. The yield on the 15-year bond issued by the 
National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) was 2.487 per cent. This 
compares to a yield of 5.472 per cent on a 15-year bond issued in October 2009. 
 
In the short term the improvement in borrowing costs is a positive development 
for Irish sovereign bonds. However, as noted in previous Commentaries, any 
deterioration of international sentiment will have significant implications for the 
borrowing costs of both the State and domestic financial institutions.  
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7
General Assessment of the Irish Economy 
 
Our forecasts suggest that the Irish economy is set to grow by almost 5 per cent 
in 2014 with unemployment likely to fall below 11.5 per cent.  The economy has 
not registered growth of this magnitude since 2005. It is evident as the year has 
progressed that, while external demand remains a key component of the 
recovery, domestic contributions, and investment in particular, have become 
increasingly important. The strong economic performance has been mirrored by 
robust government receipts with almost all headline items reporting returns 
ahead of target for the year to November. The general government deficit for 
2014 is likely to be around 3.5 per cent.  
 
Despite the strong recovery exhibited this year, output per capita in the Irish 
economy is still over 6 per cent below its peak in 2006, while the relatively high 
rates of unemployment coupled with an albeit increasing but low investment rate 
indicate that there is still spare capacity within the economy. Consequently, for 
2015, we believe the Irish economy will experience growth rates of 
approximately 4.5 per cent in both GNP and GDP with unemployment falling to 
just over 9.5 per cent. The economy will continue to benefit from a strong export 
performance while significant increases in investment are also envisaged for 
2015. 
 
While we see a significant and positive impact from foreign demand for Irish 
produced goods and services, we have moderated our forecast for 2015 
marginally from the Autumn Quarterly Economic Commentary mainly in response 
to the continued poor outlook for the Euro Area. As noted in Chapter 1 of the 
Commentary, the Euro Area has remained in a downturn since 2008 with recent 
forecasts of short-term growth suggesting an increase in output of only 0.5 per 
cent for 2014. The section also references the proposed investment plan by the 
newly-elected European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker. While full 
details of the plan are not yet available, a target of €315 billion has been set for 
investment over a three-year time horizon. The plan appears to have a significant 
reliance on private sector funds, which are aimed to supplement €21 billion of 
European public funds.  
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In the Research Note by Byrne and McQuinn, Irish economic performance over 
the period 1987 to 2013 is assessed using a growth accounting framework. The 
contribution to growth of capital, the labour market and improvements in total 
factor productivity (TFP) in Ireland is contrasted and compared with that of 14 
other European countries. The note highlights the convergence theory of the 
Celtic Tiger phase, while illustrating the impact on the Irish labour market and 
investment rates of the financial crisis of 2007/08. From a regional perspective, 
the Research Note by Morgenroth (2014) assesses the “two-speed” recovery 
theory which has gained some traction recently. Morgenroth shows that a 
growing divergence in economic performance across Irish regions had occurred 
before the present recovery. 
 
Since the Autumn Commentary, there have been three significant domestic policy 
developments:  
• Budget 2015; 
• the proposed introduction of macro-prudential policy measures by the 
Central Bank of Ireland; and  
• the stress-test results announced by the ECB and EBA.  
 
From a macroeconomic perspective, the budget can be seen as quite 
expansionary in nature. Reduced revenues from the significant tax reform 
measures announced coupled with a decline in the anticipated revenues from 
Irish Water mean a likely deficit in 2015 of 2.4 per cent. In the Autumn 
Commentary we had suggested a neutral fiscal policy, which prioritised 
expenditure on an investment as opposed to a consumption package. This would 
have resulted in a deficit of 2 per cent for next year. Undoubtedly, the taxation 
measures outlined in the budget reduces the margin of error in terms of 
achieving the 3 per cent deficit target in 2015. Consequently, the attainment of 
this target relies quite significantly on the economy achieving a strong rate of 
output growth. Given the downside risk posed to growth by the continued poor 
performance of the Euro Area, this is less cautious than we would have preferred. 
 
The distributional implications of the budget are analysed in a Special Article in 
the Commentary by Keane, Callan, Savage, Walsh and Colgan. The paper uses a 
nationally representative sample of Irish households to assess both the 
distributional impact of the recent budget along with the impact of the set of 
budgets from 2009 to 2015. Overall, the results indicate that the total impact of 
Budget 2015, when accompanied by the impact of the revised water charges, 
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resulted in a decline in income of about 1 per cent for the poorest 10 per cent of 
households. Middle income groups experienced little change in their incomes, 
while there were small increases observed for high income households. 
 
The results for the 2015 Budget are in contrast to those for the various budgets of 
the “austerity era”, 2009 to 2015. All households experienced losses in income 
due to budgetary changes during this period, with households at both ends of the 
income spectrum experiencing the most significant declines; the highest income 
group witnessed declines of about 15 and a half per cent, while the lowest 
income group saw a reduction of 12 and a half per cent. For most other income 
groups the declines were slightly less, lying around 11 per cent. Therefore, the 
analysis would appear to dispel the notion that middle income groups 
experienced the most significant decline in incomes due to budgetary changes 
during the economic crisis. Rather, the largest declines have been borne by the 
top of the income distribution with the bottom group experiencing the next 
largest losses. 
 
The proposed macro-prudential measures announced by the Central Bank of 
Ireland in October are assessed in an Appendix to the Commentary by Duffy and 
McQuinn. The submission welcomes the principle of a macro-prudential system 
in an Irish context and highlights that the changes in international, wholesale 
finance which precipitated the Irish credit boom and bust in 2007/08 are still in 
place. Thus, in an increasingly integrated global and European Financial sector, a 
macro-prudential system is necessary for future Irish financial stability purposes. 
However, the submission identifies the absence of a rules-based system as a 
weakness in the proposals. Furthermore, it suggests that any such rules should 
have a counter-cyclical dimension to them. In that context, were a counter-
cyclical rules-based approach adopted at the present time, it is unlikely that it 
would suggest the imposition of the measures proposed by the Central Bank. This 
is particularly pertinent, given the possible impact on housing supply which the 
proposed measures may have. In the interests of both efficient policy 
implementation and transparency, such a rule should be underpinned by regular 
analysis of certain key macroeconomic and housing-related indicators with the 
results published at frequent intervals. 
 
Finally, the results of the Europe-wide comprehensive assessment of financial 
institutions by the ECB and EBA in October revealed that one Irish institution, 
Permanent TSB, had failed the adverse scenario of the stress test resulting in a 
minimum capital shortfall of €855 million. The tests themselves have been the 
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subject of some criticism in terms of the assumptions underpinning the analysis, 
particularly the adverse scenario, leading some commentators to ask “how 
stressful were the stress tests?”. From both a European and Irish perspective, the 
key issue now is whether the successful outcome for most of the financial 
institutions will see an increase in credit extension to the real economy through 
2015. The Monetary and Financial section notes that despite some marginal 
increases in mortgage lending, overall credit extension to the Irish real economy 
remains very low with loan repayments continuing to exceed the draw-down of 
new loans.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Detailed Forecast Tables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A1 Exports of Goods and Services 
 
 
2012 % change in 2012 2013 % change in 2013 2014 % change in 2014 2015 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 97.0 -5.4 -4.1 91.8 7.5 7.5 98.6 7.9 7.0 106.4 
Tourism 3.0 11.5 10.6 3.4 4.5 4.0 3.5 4.4 3.4 3.7 
Other Services 82.5 7.8 6.9 88.9 5.1 3.6 93.4 4.4 3.0 97.6 
Exports Of Goods and Services 182.5 0.9 1.1 184.1 6.3 5.6 195.6 6.2 5.1 207.6 
FISM Adjustment 0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Adjusted Exports 182.5 0.8 1.1 184.1 6.2 5.6 195.5 6.2 5.1 207.6 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A2 Investment 
 
 
2012 % change in 2012 2013 % change in 2013 2014 % change in 2014 2015 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Housing 3.0 6.5 3.5 3.2 8.8 5.5 3.5 28.3 24.3 4.5 
Other Building 6.0 21.7 18.3 7.3 30.1 26.5 9.5 22.1 18.6 11.5 
Transfer Costs 0.4 38.4 36.1 0.5 20.5 17.0 0.6 13.3 10.0 0.7 
Building and Construction 9.4 17.4 14.1 11.0 23.4 19.9 13.6 23.3 19.7 16.7 
Machinery and Equipment 17.6 -11.5 -11.2 15.5 12.9 10.6 17.6 10.0 7.7 19.3 
Total Investment 26.9 -1.4 -2.4 26.5 17.3 14.3 31.1 15.8 12.8 36.0 
  
 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A3 Personal Income 
 
 
2012 % change in 2012 2013 % change in 2013 2014 % change in 2014 2015 
 
€ bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn 
Agriculture, etc 3.0 0.3 0.0 3.0 2.5 0.1 3.1 2.5 0.1 3.2 
Non-Agricultural Wages 69.5 3.4 2.3 71.9 1.7 1.2 73.1 3.8 2.8 75.8 
Other Non-Agricultural Income 14.3 6.0 0.9 15.2 14.3 2.2 17.4 14.4 2.5 19.9 
Total Income Received 86.9 3.7 3.2 90.1 3.8 3.4 93.5 5.7 5.3 98.9 
Current Transfers 25.1 -2.2 -0.6 24.5 -1.7 -0.4 24.1 -1.6 -0.4 23.7 
Gross Personal Income 111.9 2.4 2.6 114.6 2.6 3.0 117.6 4.2 5.0 122.6 
Direct Personal Taxes 24.5 3.2 0.8 25.3 6.8 1.7 27.0 3.6 1.0 28.0 
Personal Disposable Income 87.4 2.1 1.9 89.3 1.5 1.3 90.6 4.4 4.0 94.6 
Consumption 82.5 1.1 0.9 83.3 2.0 1.7 85.0 3.0 2.6 87.6 
Personal Savings 4.9 20.3 1.0 5.9 -6.1 -0.4 5.6 25.7 1.4 7.0 
Savings Ratio 5.6   6.6   6.1   7.4 
Average Personal Tax Rate 21.9   22.0   22.9   22.7 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A4 Imports of Goods and Services  
 
 
2012 % change in 2012 2013 % change in 2013 2014 % change in 2014 2015 
 € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 54.6 1.8 3.7 55.6 8.0 7.2 60.0 8.0 7.2 64.8 
Tourism 4.6 1.3 0.5 4.7 3.7 1.2 4.8 4.7 1.2 5.1 
Other Services 87.9 -0.5 -1.3 87.4 3.8 2.8 90.8 3.8 2.8 94.3 
Imports of Goods and Services 147.1 0.4 0.0 147.7 5.4 0.0 155.6 5.4 0.0 164.1 
FISM Adjustment 0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Adjusted Imports 147.1 0.4 0.6 147.7 5.4 4.5 155.6 5.4 4.5 164.1 
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FORECAST TABLE A5 Balance of Payments 
 
 
2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
€ bn € bn € bn € bn 
Exports of Goods and Services 182.5 184.1 195.6 207.6 
Imports of Goods and Services 147.1 147.7 155.6 164.1 
Net Factor Payments -31.5 -27.3 -29.0 -30.9 
Net Transfers -2.4 -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 
Balance on Current Account 1.5 6.6 8.5 10.2 
As a % of GNP 1.1 4.5 5.5 6.2 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A6 Employment and Unemployment, Annual Average 
 
 
2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
000s 000s 000s 000s 
Agriculture 85.8 106.8 110.1 109.5 
Industry 336 343 348 368 
  of which: Construction 102 102 109 118 
Services 1,421 1,431 1,453 1,485 
Total at Work 1,842 1,880 1,913 1,962 
Unemployed 316 282 244 210 
Labour Force 2,154 2,163 2,157 2,172 
Unemployment Rate, % 14.7 13.0 11.3 9.7 
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Assessment of Proposed Macro-Prudential 
Policy Measures 
David Duffy and Kieran McQuinn 
Introduction and Background 
In this note, we assess the recent macro-prudential measures outlined by the 
Central Bank of Ireland. The intended policy levers, which are outlined in a 
Consultation Paper from the Central Bank of Ireland (2014), consist of the 
following two related proposals: 
1. To restrict lending for primary dwelling purchase above 80 per cent loan-to-
value (LTV) to no more than 15 per cent of the aggregate flow of all housing 
loans for principal dwelling purposes and 
2. To restrict lending for primary dwelling purchase above 3.5 times loan-to-
income (LTI) to no more than 20 per cent of that aggregate value. 
 
These measures come at a time when house prices have been, since early 2013, 
increasing quite strongly, particularly in the Dublin area. In Figure 1 the year-on-
year growth rates in both national and Dublin house prices are plotted. The 
increased rate of house price inflation is evident from late 2012/early 2013. 
However, in Figure 2 where the levels of both prices are plotted, it is clear that 
prices are still approximately 50 per cent below the height of the market in mid-
2007. 
 
General Assessment 
In principle, the potential application of a macro-prudential suite of measures in 
the Irish property market is a welcome and prudent development. The Irish 
property boom and subsequent bust over the period 2003-2013 was almost 
entirely facilitated by the sharp increase in mortgage credit extended by financial 
institutions operating in the Irish market. Changes in international finance from 
1999/2000 onwards were especially influential in an Irish context. In particular, 
the advent and growth in international wholesale funding by European financial 
institutions resulted in a significant shift in the aggregate Irish credit supply curve 
without any real consequences for interest rates. In Figure 3 the large gap post-
2003 between lending by Irish financial institutions and deposit levels is 
presented, while the substantial increase in the total external debt of the Irish 
Banking sector is evident from Figure 4.  
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The far-reaching implications of this credit boom have been well documented 
with the ultimate consequence being the threat to the solvency of the Irish State. 
It is important to understand that the developments in international banking 
finance which led to the Irish credit boom are still in place. It is in that context 
that the efficient application of a macro-prudential suite of policy levers is 
essential in safeguarding future financial stability. Gerlach and Peng (2005) 
examine how regulatory changes reduced the sensitivity of bank lending to 
property prices in the case of the Hong Kong market, while Duffy (2013) discusses 
the potential benefits of a macro-prudential system in an Irish context. 
 
However, we feel that in the interests of both efficiency of policy implementation 
and the transparency with which these measures are communicated to key 
market participants, these levers should be applied on a counter-cyclical rules 
basis. This is not the case with the present proposals. In that context we would 
question both the absence of such rules underpinning the proposed framework 
and the application of the proposed measures in the Irish market at the present 
time. 
 
Detailed Observations on the Proposed Measures 
1. It is prudent that both loan-to-value ratios and loan-to-income multiples are 
included in any suite of macro-prudential measures. Research by Campbell 
and Cocco (2011) argues that regulators and mortgage providers should think 
about combinations of these concepts rather than controlling these levers in 
isolation, while McCarthy and McQuinn (2013) provide evidence of 
differences in the usage of both credit channels (loan-to-values and loan-to-
income ratios) by Irish credit institutions during the period 2000 to 2010. In 
particular, McCarthy and McQuinn (2013) demonstrate that, over the period 
in question, Irish institutions appear to rely more on the LTI channel as a 
means of extending increased levels of credit than the loan-to-value concept. 
In particular McCarthy and McQuinn define the income fraction (κ) as the 
proportion of gross income which Irish financial institutions allow mortgaged 
households to allocate to their mortgage repayment. The concept can be 
related to the LTI as follows 
𝜅 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿
�
1 − (1 +  𝑅𝑡)−𝜏
𝑅𝑡
�
 
where Rt is the interest rate and τ is the duration of the mortgage. This is plotted for 
Irish mortgage institutions in Figure 5.  The large increase in the proportion is 
particularly evident between 2005 and 2008. 
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2. An increasing body of research in the macro-prudential area now argues for 
the use of rules in implementing these policy levers rather than discretion. 
Borio and Shim (2007), Goodhart (2004) and Galati and Moessner (2012), 
amongst others, have highlighted the importance of rules (or built in 
stabilisers) as opposed to discretion in calibrating macro-prudential policy 
with the latter noting the necessity of rules for accountability, transparency 
and efficacy of policy implementation. 
 
3. In that context, it is regrettable that no such rule has been outlined by the 
Central Bank in proposing these measures. Any such rule, we believe, needs 
to take into account cyclical patterns within the housing market i.e. the rule 
should be counter-cyclical in nature with policy measures being tightened if 
the rule indicates the presence of too much credit, for example, in the 
market and loosened if the opposite is the case. 
 
4. Such a rule should be based on a number of key housing and property 
market related indicators. For example, a rule could be based on the 
following: 
• The observed growth in house prices; 
• The relationship between actual house prices and an estimate of a 
“fundamental” house price. The fundamental price could be based on a 
rent-price ratio (as in Gallin (2008)) or econometrically estimated as in 
McQuinn (2014); 
• The observed rate of mortgage credit growth; 
• The level of housing market activity such as the number of housing units 
built and the ratio of housing construction to overall national output.  
 
5. At this point in the Irish market based on these criteria, it is not clear that 
the envisaged measures are fully warranted. While house price growth has 
been significant over the past 18 months, in McQuinn (2014), for example, 
the results of four standard models of Irish house prices suggest that, as of 
Q4 2013, Irish house prices still appear to be undervalued. This is mainly due 
to the very sharp and persistent fall recorded in Irish house prices between 
2007 and early 2013. In Figure 6 the degree of undervaluation from the four 
models is plotted.  
 
6. Furthermore, McQuinn (2014) also examines the stock and flow of mortgage 
credit in the domestic market. This analysis suggests that credit levels are 
still very low in the Irish mortgage market and are not a significant 
determinant of price movements at this point.  
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7. Finally, housing construction is at historically low levels with an average of 
just over 9,000 units being built in the Irish market between 2011 and 2013.  
 
8. The key issue then is whether it is appropriate to apply the proposed 
measures in such a context.  Both policy levers (restrictions on LTVs and LTIs) 
are, as a growing literature suggests, quite powerful in moderating house 
price inflation, therefore the introduction of these measures sends quite a 
strong signal to the market.  
 
9. This is important as far as the supply-side of the market is concerned. Most 
commentators have identified a lack of housing supply as the main policy 
concern in the Irish housing market at present. Duffy, Byrne and Fitzgerald 
(2014) estimate that something in the region of 25,000 new households will 
be formed per annum in the medium-term. Given the already very low levels 
of housing construction, there is a danger that the adoption of these 
measures may have additional, adverse implications for future residential 
supply. Both property developers and financial institutions may be 
concerned about movements in future prices and the potential affordability 
of prospective mortgagers. 
 
10. Alternatively, a counter-cyclical rules-based approach to macro-prudential 
policy could help to anchor house price expectations going forward. A 
potential range could be identified for both LTVs and LTIs and the maximum 
amount of each lever on that range permissible by the Regulator would be 
established at any point in time on the basis of a counter-cyclical rule. From 
a housing supply perspective, this would have the highly desirable effect of 
removing significant fluctuations in house price movements and 
consequently enabling financiers and property developers alike to plan 
housing supply decisions in a more stable and sustainable manner.  
 
11. Overall, in the interests of policy efficiency and transparency, any such rule 
should be on the basis of a regular assessment of the indicators discussed in 
point 4 with the results of the relevant analysis published. 
 
12. Ultimately, if such a rule were successful, it could potentially have quite a 
significant stabilising influence on price expectations within the market. 
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FIGURE 1 Year-on-Year Changes (%) in Irish House Prices (Nominal) 2006:1 - 2014:9
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
 
FIGURE 2 Irish House Price (Nominal) Levels (Index 2005 =100) 2005:1 - 2014:9
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
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FIGURE 3 Private Sector Lending and Deposits (€ 000 millions) to the Irish Economy 1995 Q1 - 2013 Q1
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland. 
 
 
FIGURE 4 Total External Debt of the Irish Banking Sector (€ 000 millions) 2001 Q1 - 2010 Q2
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland. 
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FIGURE 5 Average Mortgage Income Fraction (%) of Irish Financial Institutions 2000 Q2 - 2010 Q4
 
 
Source:  McCarthy and McQuinn (2013). 
 
 
FIGURE 6 Percentage Difference between Actual and Fundamental Prices 2000 Q1 - 2013 Q4
 
 
 
Source:  McQuinn (2014). 
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Distributional Impact of Tax, Welfare and 
Public Service Pay Policies: Budget 2015 and 
Budgets 2009-2015 
Claire Keane, Tim Callan, Michael Savage, John R. Walsh and Brian 
Colgan1 
Abstract 
This article analyses the impact of Budget 2015 on a nationally representative 
sample of households, taking into account the effects of the revised water 
charges. We also examine the overall impact of budgets since the start of the 
crisis. We measure the impact by comparing actual policy with a distributionally-
neutral budget, indexed in line with expected wage growth. Compared with this 
benchmark, we find that at an aggregate level, household incomes net of tax, 
PRSI, USC and water charges were broadly unchanged by Budget 2015. However, 
there were differences across income groups. Net incomes for the 10 per cent of 
households with the lowest incomes are expected to be close to 1 per cent lower 
under 2015 policy than under an indexed 2014 policy. Net incomes for middle 
income groups will see little change, while there will be small percentage gains 
for high income households; just over half of one per cent for the top income 
group. 
 
The overall impact of the set of budgets for 2009 to 2015, is quite different. These 
budgets led to substantial income losses at all income levels: we call these “policy 
induced losses” to distinguish them from income losses arising from other 
sources, e.g., unemployment, lower wages, and falling self-employment incomes. 
Over much of the income range, there are broadly similar percentage losses for 
each income group. But the greatest percentage losses are for the highest income 
group (about 15 and a half per cent) and the lowest income group (close to 13 
per cent). For most other income groups, the income loss was in a narrow range, 
between 10 and 11 per cent. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1  We thank CSO for access to SILC data on which the SWITCH tax-benefit model is based. We are grateful to Sean Lyons 
and Anne Pentecost for estimates of the distributional impact of indirect taxes, as described in the Appendix. We 
thank an anonymous reader for comments; any remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors. 
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Introduction 
In this article we focus on the distributional impact of the main tax and welfare 
measures in Budget 2015. We also take account of the transition from full tax-
financing of water services to a system with water charges, as per the revised 
system announced on 19 November. Budget 2015 is, of course, the latest 
instalment in a series of budgets designed to bring the government deficit and 
debt under control. We look therefore, not just at this latest instalment, but also 
at the cumulative impact of all budgets from October 2008 onwards.2 
 
We use SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model,3 to ensure that we obtain a 
nationally representative picture based on SILC (Survey of Income and Living 
Conditions), the CSO’s main survey of household income.4  The areas covered by 
SWITCH, including income tax, social insurance, property tax, welfare benefits 
and public service remuneration,5 account for the bulk of the impact of budgetary 
policy changes on households’ cash incomes in recent years. This year the model 
is further extended to deal with water charges. There are, however, some taxes 
(e.g., indirect taxes, which affect the purchasing power of cash incomes) which 
cannot at present be integrated fully within that framework. Last year we used a 
number of experimental approaches (Callan et al., 2013) to extend the coverage 
of the analysis to take account of indirect tax changes and some specific policy 
changes where direct evidence is not available within SILC.6 We continue to use 
these approaches here in our analysis of budgetary impacts across the income 
distribution.  
 
Most tax-benefit models internationally focus on income-related taxes, Social 
Insurance Contributions and cash benefits. As well as capturing these standard 
elements, the SWITCH model goes beyond this to include a range of issues not 
commonly dealt with by international models. The model has been extended to 
include property tax, public service pay and water charges; and post-model 
adjustments help to deal also with indirect taxes, DIRT and some reliefs related to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2  Budget 2015 broke from the pattern of contractionary budgets; when the impact of water charges is taken into 
account, the overall net impact on household incomes is broadly neutral. 
3  See Callan et al. (2012) for a full description of the model. 
4  While selected examples can illustrate particular points, they are unable to provide a broadly representative picture 
of the impact of tax and welfare policy changes. 
5  Public sector pay cuts formed part of the austerity package, and are included in our analysis as their structure 
incorporated a distributional motivation, and their cash impact can be traced. Keane et al. (2014) present results 
which identify the separate impacts of tax increases, welfare cuts and public sector pay cuts. 
6  The methods referred to deal with the introduction of a carbon tax and a later increase in its rate; changes to VAT; 
increases in the Deposit Interest Retention Tax (DIRT); restrictions on pension tax reliefs for high income earners; 
restrictions on tax relief for medical insurance premia; and increases in Capital Gains Tax (CGT). For further details see 
Callan et al. (2013b). 
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pension contributions and health insurance. The breadth of this analysis 
compares favourably with most international models. 
 
In this analysis we do not attempt to measure the impact of cuts in public services 
on households at different income levels. While this is an important area, it raises 
complex questions as to the appropriate concepts and measures to use, as 
pointed out by O’Dea and Preston (2012) and by Callan and Keane (2009). 
Analysis of the impact of changes in public services is at a much less advanced 
stage internationally. In recent years the UK Treasury (HM Treasury, 2014) has 
begun to publish analyses which seek to distribute the value of public spending 
across the household income distribution. O’Dea and Preston (2012) raise some 
questions about the assumptions made, and propose some alternative methods; 
but these methods have yet to be implemented. There is no agreed standard 
methodology for the attribution of benefits from public spending to households. 
This is an area in which considerable further research is needed, but it is not one 
in which there is an agreed international approach which can simply be applied to 
Ireland. Work on the SWITCH Research Programme7 in the areas of health and 
housing can contribute to enhancing understanding of the issues. The present 
article, like most international assessments of the distributional impact of policy, 
is focused on taxes and transfers, which have a clearer cash value, rather than on 
services, for which there are separate and substantial problems of valuation and 
attribution. 
 
The results we obtain relate to the “cash” or “first round” effects of policy 
changes, before any adjustments in individual behaviour such as changes in 
employment status or hours of work. This is by far the most common approach 
internationally (for example, this is the approach taken by the UK’s Institute for 
Fiscal Studies in its post-budget assessment, and by the Brookings/Urban 
Institute’s Tax Policy Center in the US in assessing new policy proposals). In other 
work (e.g., Savage et al,. 2014) we highlight the impact of tax and welfare 
changes on financial incentives to work such as marginal tax rates and 
replacement rates. The extent and nature of response to these financial 
incentives has also been examined in Layte and Callan (2001) and in Callan et al. 
(2009). The findings of such research need also to be taken into account when 
policy is trying to balance the sometimes conflicting objectives of equity and 
efficiency. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
7  See www.esri.ie/research/research_areas/taxation-welfare-and-pens/. 
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Measuring the Distributional Impact of Policy 
Who has gained and who has lost from the measures included in Budget 2015, 
and the associated water charges? What has been the overall impact of the 
austerity budgets over the past seven years? Analysis based on selected example 
households8 is common in immediate post-budget commentary, but this can 
never give us an overall picture of the impact of the budget for the population as 
a whole: it fails to take into account how common or uncommon these household 
types are in the population. To get an accurate overall picture of the impact of tax 
and welfare policy changes we need to do the calculations for large numbers of 
real households in a nationally representative sample. The ESRI tax-benefit model 
(SWITCH) allows us to do this: it estimates the impact of direct tax and welfare 
changes using anonymised data from the CSO’s SILC.  
 
The impact of policy change must be measured against an alternative specifying 
what would happen if the policy change did not take place (a “counterfactual” 
policy). In the construction of budgets, the official procedure constructs an 
“opening budget” against which changes are measured. For tax and welfare the 
conventional opening budget simply freezes tax rates, credits and welfare 
payments at their existing levels. While this is useful in accounting terms, it would 
be highly misleading in an analysis of distributional impact.9  In normal times, 
with nominal wages, prices and real wages all showing positive growth, 
implementing the conventional opening budget would lead to real income losses 
for those dependent on welfare, while further up the income distribution 
incomes would rise. (Callan et al. (2001), Bargain and Callan (2008)).10  The 
alternative used here is a policy which indexes both tax and welfare parameters 
with respect to the expected growth or decline in wages. This ensures that 
average tax rates are held constant (i.e., no fiscal drag); and leads to 
approximately equal growth (or decline) in income across different income 
groups (Callan et al., 2001). It should be clear that this is designed to provide a 
“distributionally neutral” benchmark, and is not intended as a policy 
recommendation. There are many reasons why it may be desirable to depart 
from this benchmark; but having a distributionally neutral benchmark is essential 
in examining the distributional impact of policy changes. 
 
We use forecasts of wage growth (or decline) to implement this approach on a 
prospective basis. Results examining the impact of Budget 2015 are based on 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
8  For example, a one-earner couple with two children. 
9  For a more detailed exposition, see Callan et al. (2001). 
10  When wages are falling, the conventional benchmark would give rise to income gains for welfare recipients and 
income losses for those in employment. 
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forecast wage growth of 1.4 per cent for 2015. This is an average of wage growth 
forecasts by the ESRI’s Quarterly Economic Commentary (Duffy et al., 2014) and 
the Central Bank’s Quarterly Bulletin (Central Bank of Ireland, 2014.). Similarly, 
for income growth between 2008 and 2015 we use figures on wage growth from 
the CSO’s Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs Survey for the available years 
(2009 to 2013) and the average of the wage forecasts from the ESRI’s Quarterly 
Economic Commentary and the Central Bank’s Quarterly Bulletin for 2014 and 
2015. The net result is that growth in wages between 2008 and 2015 is expected 
to be less than half of one per cent.  
 
Results shown are at the household level unless otherwise specified and are 
based on household disposable income (after taxes and benefits), adjusted for 
household size and composition, i.e., income per adult equivalent or “equivalised 
income”.11 
 
Water Charges 
While water charges are not technically a “budgetary measure” it is our view that 
they need to be taken into account when considering the impact of Budget 2015. 
Up to now, water services have been financed predominantly from taxation. The 
introduction of user charges for water can be seen as replacing some of the tax 
financing. From the point of view of an individual household, it will see a net 
benefit if its tax bill falls by more than the new water charge, and a net cost if the 
water charge is greater than a tax reduction.  
 
Assessing the net balance between tax cuts and water charges requires a tax-
benefit model to arrive at a clear overall picture, as administrative statistics do 
not permit this. The proposals regarding water announced on Budget day 
included a payment to those in receipt of a Household Benefit Package or Fuel 
Allowance, and a tax credit. SWITCH estimates suggested that this would reach 
88 per cent of households. The revised water policy now makes provision for 
what is termed a “Water Conservation Grant” of €100, thus reaching the 
remaining 12 per cent of households. Charges are now capped at €160 for a one-
adult household and €260 for a multi-adult household. The net effect is a low net 
price to the consumer, with a dual rate structure: when the €100 grant is factored 
in, this means a net payment of €60 for a one-adult household and €160 for a 
multi-adult household. Our analysis includes these net costs for each household. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
11  This adjusts income to take account of household size. The scale used is the scale used in official monitoring of 
poverty in Ireland, i.e., 1 for the first adult, 0.66 for subsequent adults and 0.33 for children aged 14 or under. 
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Budget 2015 
A wide range of taxation and welfare measures are directly included in our 
model-based analysis, including: 
• The widening of the standard rate income tax bands and the 1 per cent 
decrease in the higher rate of income tax; 
• The increases to the USC thresholds, changes to the USC rates and the 
introduction of the new 8 per cent upper rate of USC; 
• The increase in the standardised child benefit payment from €130 per 
child to €135; 
• The re-introduction of a Christmas bonus12 of 25 per cent of the weekly 
payment for people in receipt of long-term social welfare payments; 
• The increase in the Living Alone Allowance; 
• The revised water charges and €100 “water conservation payment” 
announced in November; 
• Reductions in property tax rates for about half of the local authority 
areas; as this includes large urban areas, more than half of all households 
will gain from these reductions. 
 
Some changes are too complex to be included in the model at this stage. Chief 
among these are: 
• the changes governing eligibility for One-Parent Family Payment, with a 
reduction in the age limit for a qualifying child becoming effective in mid-
2015, and a special Jobseeker Transition payment acting as an alternative 
for many of those affected; 
• the Back to Work Family Dividend, whereby long-term unemployed 
people may retain the child-related portion of their welfare payment; in 
full for one year, and 50 per cent for a second year; 
• the Housing Assistance Payment, currently being piloted, and due to be 
phased in nationally during 2015. 
 
Research is underway to incorporate these aspects, and results will be published 
as they become available.   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
12  The bonus for 2014 was announced in Budget 2015, and is included in the analysis of this budget.  
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FIGURE 1 Impact of Budget 2015 - Percentage Change in Disposable Income by Income Decile 
 
 
 
Source:  SWITCH estimates at December 2014, including the impact of water charges, changes to income tax bands, changes 
to USC and the welfare measures specified in the text.  
 
The overall impact on household incomes of Budget 2015 and water charges is 
close to neutral, increasing average income by less than 0.1 per cent. Figure 1 
shows that within this framework, there are gains and losses relative to a 
distributionally neutral wage-indexed budget. The largest losses are for the 
bottom decile, an average loss of just over 1 per cent, and for the second decile. 
Losses are incurred in each of the bottom six deciles, with the percentage loss 
declining as incomes increase. From the seventh decile onwards there are small 
gains. The top decile gains the most with an average gain of 0.6 per cent. This 
pattern of losses in the bottom half of the income distribution, declining as 
income rises, and gains in the upper reaches, rising with income can clearly be 
described as regressive.13 
 
The introduction of a new, higher USC rate counterbalancing the cut in the top 
tax rate for those on very high incomes gives rise to a less unequal outcome than 
a simple top rate tax cut. A simple top rate tax cut would have cost in the region 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
13  Technically a regressive impact is one which involves the net percentage gain increasing with income, while a 
progressive impact would see the net percentage gain declining as income increases. A proportional impact would 
see the same percentage gain or loss across all income groups. Some patterns, including those for the 2009-2015 
analysis undertaken here, are more complex and cannot be characterised simply as progressive, regressive or 
proportional. 
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of €230m in a full year. In effect, the higher USC rate claws back close to €100m 
of this, by capping the gains of those on the highest incomes at the same level as 
those on €70,000 per year.14 Nevertheless, there are gains for all top rate 
taxpayers, and the fact that these are concentrated in the higher income deciles 
means that this group sees the greatest proportionate gains.  
 
It should be recalled that these losses or gains are relative to the benchmark 
scenario, in which welfare payments and tax bands and credits are indexed in line 
with wage growth of 1.4 per cent. This indexed benchmark reminds us that even 
if taxes and welfare were kept constant in nominal terms, those in work would 
experience some “fiscal drag” as more of their income would be taxed at higher 
rates; and those depending on welfare payments would see their incomes fall 
further behind the average. 
 
Budgets 2009-2015 
Ireland’s fiscal adjustment has been long and painful. Having examined the latest 
Budget, we now review the cumulative impact of the overall adjustment, from 
the initial Budget 2009 (October 2008) onwards. How have the changes 
implemented since the onset of the recession affected those at differing income 
levels? It must be remembered that this analysis includes a much wider range of 
measures taken over the seven years, including: 
• the main changes to income tax, including cuts to income tax credits and 
the width of the standard rate band;  
• the introduction of Universal Social Charge and subsequent revisions; 
• elimination of the PRSI ceiling; 
• the net changes in welfare payment rates over the period, with pension 
payment rates retaining the increase awarded in October 2008, and 
working-age payments ultimately reduced below their 2008 levels; 
• net reductions in Child Benefit payment rates, with cuts in earlier years 
only partly offset by an increase in 2015; 
• reductions in Jobseeker’s Allowance for the young unemployed; 
• the impact of the public sector pension levy (Pension Related Deduction, 
PRD);  
• explicit cuts in public service pay in 2010 and in 2013 as part of the 
Haddington Road Agreement);  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
14  A further effect, incompletely captured here, is that a simple substitution of 1 per cent USC for 1 per cent top tax rate 
is likely to involve some losses for high income taxpayers, as USC does not permit many of the offsets in tax 
allowances or credits which are possible in the income tax system. 
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• reductions in public service pensions;   
• the introduction of the Local Property Tax;  
• abolition of the Christmas Bonus in 2009, and its partial restoration in 
2015; 
• cutbacks in certain elements of the Household Benefits Package. 
 
We augment the standard SWITCH model with estimates from other sources15 of 
the distributional impact of a number of other policy changes.  
FIGURE 2 Impact of Budgetary Policy 2009-2015 - Percentage Change in Disposable Income by Income Decile 
 
 
Source:  SWITCH model at December 2014 incorporating main changes in direct tax, welfare and public service pay/pensions, 
and water charges; augmented by results on carbon tax and VAT, DIRT, specific Budget 2014 restrictions of tax reliefs 
for pension contributions and medical insurance premia, and Capital Gains Tax as described in Callan et al. (2013b). 
 
The overall scale of the impact of austerity policies is determined by macro-level 
decisions regarding the size of tax increases and the extent of the reduction in 
welfare payments and public service pay. The distribution of these income losses 
over income groups depends on the detail of budgetary decisions regarding tax 
structures, welfare payment rates and decisions on the structure of public service 
pay cuts. Figure 2 summarises how the adjustment is spread over income groups 
(deciles) ranked from poorest to richest, taking into account these detailed tax, 
welfare and public service pay decisions. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
15  Details of the methods can be found in Callan et al. (2013b). 
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For six of the ten deciles the income loss arising from policy changes was 
between 10 per cent and 11¼ per cent. Outside this band, the highest losses were 
for the top decile, which is estimated as having lost 15 and a half per cent of its 
income due to the policy changes examined here. The bottom decile is estimated 
as having policy-induced losses of 12¾ per cent. Somewhat lower losses are 
found in deciles 2 and 3, which include a higher than average representation of 
pensioner households. 
 
The results for Budgets 2009 to 2015 are too complex to be characterised as 
either regressive, progressive or proportional. Over a substantial range the 
pattern is broadly proportional, but this does not extend to whole income 
distribution. The greatest policy-induced losses have been at the top of the 
income distribution, and the next greatest losses at the bottom. Only the third 
decile had a significantly lower loss (under 8 per cent) than others. To sum up: 
the net effect of Budgets 2009 to 2015 has been to squeeze incomes at all income 
levels, but by most of all at the top and the bottom of the income distribution.16  
 
Impact by Family Type 
The preceding analyses have examined the impact of the current budget, Budget 
2015, and the impact of all budgets 2009-2015 across the income distribution. 
Here we examine how different family types have been affected by budgetary 
policy changes. The analysis is conducted at the level of what is termed a “tax 
unit”, i.e. an individual or couple, together with dependent children, if any. Young 
adults including third-level students are treated as independent tax units.17 
 
The largest family type (with over three times as many cases as any other) is 
single employed people without children and it has the largest gain. This category 
is set to gain on average 0.5 per cent from Budget 2015. Other family types with 
small gains include the single retired, and two-earner couples with and without 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
16  In a broader analysis of the full impact of the recession itself and of policy measures, Callan et al. (2014) show that 
over the 2008 to 2012 period, the greatest percentage income losses were at the bottom of the income distribution, 
followed by the top. Different patterns are found by Maitre et al. (2014) in examining a measure of “economic 
stress”, which includes both objective items and items involving respondent’s judgements on their circumstances: the 
measure of economic stress is found to have risen most for middle income groups. One factor intervening between 
incomes and economic stress is the cost of housing. Callan et al. (forthcoming) will examine the extent, if any, to 
which results for income measures net of housing costs may differ from those based on incomes before housing 
costs. 
17  For this analysis, only the core modelled elements can be taken into account; it is not possible to cover the additional 
elements such as VAT changes, DIRT etc. in this analysis. The broad pattern of family-type impacts is not likely to be 
strongly affected by the addition of the extra-model elements. Work is currently underway to allow for the 
incorporation of indirect tax changes at family type level. 
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children. The biggest losses are to be found among those who are of working age, 
but not at work: those who are unemployed, non-earning lone parents, and those 
who are ill or have a disability all see losses of at least 1 per cent. 
 
TABLE 1 Impact of Budgetary Policy 2009-2015 - Percentage Change in Disposable Income by Family Type 
 Budget 2015 Budgets      
2009-2015 
Proportion of 
Families 
 % change % change % 
Single Retired Tax Unit 0.2 -5.2 11 
Retired Couple -0.4 -5.9 7 
Single Employed without Children 0.5 -8.0 34 
All Other Tax Units -1.3 -9.1 8 
Single Earner Couple without Children -0.2 -9.7 5 
Employed Lone Parent -0.5 -9.7 5 
Dual Earner Couple without Children 0.4 -11.1 5 
Dual Earner Couple with Children 0.3 -11.2 9 
Single Earner Couple with Children -0.1 -12.1 7 
Unemployed Couple -1.4 -12.3 2 
Non-Earning Lone Parent -1.0 -12.6 2 
Single Unemployed without Children -1.2 -22.4 4 
 
Source:  SWITCH model at December 2014 incorporating main changes in direct tax, welfare, public service 
pay/pensions, and water charges. 
 
In respect of Budgets 2009-2015, losses are larger and more widespread and 
there are no gains. Single unemployed people without children have experienced 
by far the largest losses (more than 22 per cent): this reflects the cuts to 
jobseeker payments for the young unemployed in particular. Most family types 
saw losses of between 8 and 13 per cent. The contributing factors to the losses 
vary by income level. At the lowest income levels, reductions in welfare payment 
rates, property tax and water charges play significant roles. At the highest income 
levels, major contributory factors are income-related taxes (income tax and USC) 
and cuts in public sector pay. The lowest losses, of between 5 and 6 per cent, 
were experienced by single retired tax units and retired couples. This reflects the 
protection afforded to pension payments throughout crisis budgets. 
 
Conclusion 
The Budget 2015 package needs to be considered together with the revised 
package of water charges and the “Water Conservation Grant”. Our analysis 
provides a nationally representative picture of the impact of the main tax and 
welfare changes in Budget 2015, taking into account the revised water package. 
The net impact is negative for low income groups, with the greatest loss, about 1 
per cent, for households with the lowest incomes. There are small gains for high 
income groups due to income tax reductions, with a gain of 0.6 per cent for the 
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highest income group. However, as the scale of the adjustment in Budget 2015 
was small, the overall picture of gains and losses from the beginning of the 
austerity budgets remains similar to what was observed last year, i.e., the 
greatest losses imposed by austerity budgets have been for the top 10 per cent of 
households, with above average losses also experienced by the lowest income 
households. 
 
Analysis at family unit level reveals that the greatest losses imposed by Budgets 
2009 to 2015 were for single unemployed people, while the lowest losses were 
for pensioners. This reflects the substantial cuts in welfare payment rates for the 
young unemployed in particular, and the fact that pension payment rates, unlike 
working age payment rates, were not reduced. 
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Irish Economic Performance 1987-2013: A 
Growth Accounting Assessment 
 
*David Byrne and Kieran McQuinn1 
Introduction 
In this Note we examine the contribution to Irish economic performance over the 
period 1987 to 2013 comparing it with that of 14 European countries. In 
particular, we note the relative performance of the Irish labour market, aggregate 
investment and trends in total factor productivity over this time. This work is part 
of a broader work stream assessing economic performance at a European level.  
 
Assessment Framework 
The analytical framework which we use to assess both Irish and European 
performance is based on the standard assumption that output is produced 
according to a Cobb-Douglas production function 
 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝐾𝑡𝛼𝐿𝑡1−𝛼 
where 𝑌𝑡 is real output,
2 𝐾𝑡 is capital input,  𝐿𝑡 is labour input (defined in this 
paper as total hours worked), and 𝐴𝑡 is total factor productivity. Output growth 
can then be expressed as 
 
𝑌?̇?
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐴?̇?
𝐴𝑡
+ α𝐾?̇?
𝐾𝑡
+ (1 −  α) 𝐿?̇?
𝐿𝑡
 
Using data on output growth, capital growth and labour growth, Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) growth can be calculated. As there is no official capital stock 
series for the Irish economy, we construct this series using a perpetual inventory 
method. To do this we assume that the initial stock of capital in 1970 equals the 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1  Thanks to Frances Ruane and Alan Barrett for comments on a previous draft. Any remaining errors are the 
responsibility of the authors. 
2  For all other European countries, GDP is the output series used. However, in an Irish context, we use GNP owing to 
the relevance of the multinational sector to the Irish economy.  
* david.byrne@esri.ie; kieran.mcquinn@esri.ie  
ESRI Research Notes 2014/4/1 
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steady-state value implied by the Solow growth model in this year based on the 
trends at that point for GDP growth, the investment share of GDP and the growth 
rate of labour input. The rest of the capital stock series is then derived using the 
following definition: 
𝐾𝑡 = (1 −  𝛿)𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝐿𝑡−1 
with a depreciation rate of six per cent per annum. For more on the assumptions 
underpinning the growth calculations see McQuinn and Whelan (2007) and 
McQuinn and Whelan (2008). 
 
Based on this approach, we now decompose Irish economic performance since 
1987 along with that of 14 comparator European countries.3  In Figures 1 to 4 we 
plot the annual growth rates for some of the key Irish macroeconomic series from 
1987 to 2013. 
 
Irish Performance in a European Context  
Pre-Crisis 1987-2006 
In the two decades preceding the 2007/08 financial crisis, Ireland exhibited one 
of the strongest growth performances amongst the countries in question. The 
Irish performance over the period has been attributed to a “belated 
convergence” phenomenon (see Honohan and Walsh (2002)). The eventual 
achievement of a relatively stable macroeconomic policy environment by the late 
1980s enabled the coupling of a young, well-educated labour force on the supply 
side of the economy with a large increase in multi-national investment due to 
Ireland’s competitive corporate tax regime. The growth which took place in Irish 
performance since the early 1990s thus resulted in Ireland catching up with its 
neighbours, which were more productive but experiencing lower rates of 
productivity increases. 
 
In Tables 1 and 2 we present the components of output growth for 1987-1996 
and 1997-2006 for 14 European countries: Sweden, the United Kingdom and the 
12 Member States of the Euro Area as of 2002.  In both ten-year periods, Ireland 
had the greatest output growth rate. Between 1987 and 1996, the largest 
contribution to Irish growth came from TFP, accounting for 4.3 percentage points 
of the 7.2 per cent total. The magnitude of Ireland's technology growth in this 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3  All of the data with the exception of the average work week is taken from the European Commission AMECO 
database. Data on the workweek is taken from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC): 
http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/. 
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period is highlighted by the fact that the second-highest TFP growth rate, 
Finland's, was 2.2 per cent. Any analysis of trends in Irish TFP does come with 
some health warnings. For example, Honohan and Walsh (2002) discuss the role 
played by foreign direct investment (FDI) in Ireland’s productivity growth for this 
period. They note that the growth rate in productivity of foreign-owned 
manufacturing enterprises (constituting over 90 per cent of manufacturing 
exports and almost 80 per cent of all exports) was much higher than in other 
sectors of the economy.4  
 
Also, the OECD lists Ireland as among the five “best practice” member countries 
in terms of product market regulation. It is for this reason that Johansson et al. 
(2013) argue that Ireland would be the Euro Area country to receive the smallest 
benefit from structural reforms. This compares with countries such as France and 
Italy, for which significant gain from reforms is predicted. The relatively strong 
performance in Irish TFP for this period is corroborated by the recent release of 
purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted TFP levels by the Penn World Tables (see 
Feenstra et al. (2013) for details). These new data clearly show that Irish TFP 
levels increased significantly vis-à-vis other European countries from 1990 
onwards. 
 
In the 1987-1996 period, labour growth was the next most important component 
of overall output growth, accounting for 1.6 percentage points, the second-
highest growth rate among the EU states considered. Capital provided the 
smallest contribution to overall output growth in Ireland but the capital growth 
rate was nonetheless the third-highest in Europe. 
 
Between 1997 and 2006 Ireland was again first in terms of overall output growth 
(4.9 per cent), however the ranking of contributing parts changed with respect to 
the previous decade. Capital growth accounted for 2.1 per cent of the total, and 
also was the largest capital growth rate among the EU states considered. This 
reflected the large increase in both residential and commercial property 
construction which occurred in the Irish economy over this period. Labour 
contributed 1.8 per cent to growth in Ireland, second overall to labour growth in 
Spain. For the Euro Area as a whole, labour grew by 0.4 per cent in the decade, an 
increase from 0.2 per cent growth in the previous decade. There was 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
4  Honohan and Walsh (2002) argue that since Ireland has a particularly low standard rate of corporation tax on 
manufacturing among the advanced economies, certain transactions are often booked at transfer prices which have 
the effect of locating a very high fraction of the enterprise’s global profits in Ireland. Thus, in many cases, the huge 
profits recorded by the Irish affiliates may have very little to do with the manufacturing activities being conducted in 
Ireland. In the present analysis, the use of GNP as opposed to GDP as the relevant output indicator does mitigate 
somewhat this effect. 
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considerable heterogeneity among the Euro Area countries, however; Ireland, 
Greece, Spain, Belgium and Finland all increased their rate of labour growth, 
while Sweden, France, the Netherlands, Austria and Portugal remained at or near 
zero growth. Germany was the only country to have negative labour growth 
between 1997 and 2006.  
 
Irish TFP grew by 1.1 per cent between 1997 and 2006, which was among the 
highest rates in Europe in this period. Compared with the 1987-1996 period, 
however, the magnitude of productivity growth was much lower in Ireland. This is 
likely attributable to the increasing share of the relatively low-productivity 
construction sector in Irish output. In a European context, in contrast to the 
previous ten-year period in which every country had positive TFP growth, there 
was negative productivity growth in Italy, Spain and Portugal. 
 
Tables 3 and 4 decompose labour growth5 further into its constituent parts; 
population growth, the participation rate, the employment rate and growth in 
the average working week. Ireland's strong overall growth in labour in both 
decades can be attributed to growth in population and participation, with growth 
in the employment rate a feature of the earlier decade. Spain and Luxembourg 
were among the other states to have particularly large labour growth rates. 
 
Between 1987 and 1996, Ireland had the largest employment rate growth, while 
also having the largest fall in average hours per week. This could represent 
growth in shorter-hours worked at the margin; a significant proportion of the gain 
in employment in this period was likely due to activation of people who were 
previously out of the labour force with many of them taking up part-time 
employment. As noted by McCarthy and McQuinn (2008), the increase in labour 
force participation in Ireland, particularly among women, was a sign of the 
dynamism of the Irish labour market. The participation rate in Ireland grew by 1.8 
per cent and by 1.3 per cent in 1987-1996 and 1997-2006, respectively. This 
compares with growth in Euro Area participation rates of 0.3 and 0.4 per cent in 
the two ten-year periods. While Ireland's participation growth was particularly 
high, participation increases were widespread across Europe in both decades. 
 
Post-Crisis: 2007 to the Present 
In both the 1987-1996 and 1997-2006 periods, all 14 states we consider had 
positive output growth. In the subsequent five-year crisis period, however, only 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
5  Transformation of labour growth rates in Tables 1 and 2 by (1-α) matches the labour growth rates in Tables 3 and 4. 
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four had positive rates of output growth. The largest decrease in output was 
found in Greece, followed by Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Table 5 
summarises output growth over the 2007–2013 for the different countries. The 
profound decline in Irish economic activity was, of course, related to the 
substantial credit boom which had accumulated in the period immediately 
preceding the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Thus, the Irish economy was, 
arguably, more exposed than most to the subsequent economic instabilities. 
 
The capital stock in the Euro Area had been growing at rates between 2 and 3 per 
cent per year between the late 1970s and the onset of the crisis (McQuinn and 
Whelan (2013)). Table 5 shows relatively weak growth in the capital stock in the 
post-crisis period, as a result of a falling investment share of GDP. From Table 5 it 
is also evident that, like most European countries, the contribution to growth 
from increases in both TFP and investment declined significantly in an Irish 
context. Growth in the Irish capital stock was particularly hit by the post-2007 
decline in activity in the construction sector as the credit bubble preceding the 
crisis had resulted in a significant over-supply of residential housing units.6  
 
Developments in the Irish labour market were especially affected by the onset of 
the financial crisis. For the Euro Area as a whole, the unemployment rate rose 
from approximately 7 per cent at the onset of the crisis to 12 per cent by 2013. 
This EA-wide increase masks the heterogeneity in labour market outcomes for 
individual countries. While Germany and Austria maintained relatively low levels 
of unemployment, Ireland along with France, Italy, Portugal, Greece and Spain 
saw unemployment rise significantly above 10 per cent. Table 5 shows the 
considerable impact changes in the labour component had on output growth. The 
labour component fell by 2.6 per cent in Ireland, the largest decrease across the 
countries we consider.  
 
We decompose the labour growth rates in Table 6. Ireland had the greatest fall in 
labour market participation between 2007 and 2012, in a reversal of the 
increasing participation of the previous 20 years. The significant flows out of the 
labour force in Ireland stopped the unemployment rate from rising further than it 
did. The elevated unemployment rates in Ireland during the crisis thus did not 
fully represent the scale of the weakness in the Irish labour market. Ireland was 
among the states with the largest decreases in the employment rate and the 
average working week. The only state for which employment grew over the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
6  At the peak of the construction boom between 2005 and 2007 an average of almost 85,000 housing units was being 
built per annum in the Irish property market. In the UK at the same time just over twice the amount of units (215,000) 
were being built, despite a fourteen-fold population differential. 
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period was Germany. On the other hand, population growth had a positive 
impact in every state except Germany.  
 
Future Issues and Concluding Comments 
The results presented in this Note are part of a larger body of work assessing the 
medium-term growth outlook for the Irish economy. The analysis enables 
Ireland’s relative economic performance over the period 1987-2013 to be placed 
in an international context. In particular, it allows for a relative comparison of the 
main channels of economic growth; the labour market, investment and TFP. 
What is striking is that during the growth phase of the economy (1987-2006), the 
initial sub-period (1987-1996) appeared to be characterised by strong growth in 
TFP, while in the latter phase of the boom (1997-2006), greater contributions 
were forthcoming from labour and capital. 
 
Overall, from an Irish perspective, the analysis suggests that at present, the 
domestic economy is operating some way below its potential level. The 
unemployment rate is above its long-run median rate of 7.9 per cent, while TFP 
growth is below the average of 2 per cent and the investment rate, which drives 
capital growth, is below its long-run average of 21 per cent. This suggests that, 
notwithstanding the positive growth trends which have emerged recently in the 
Irish economy, considerable slack still exists across all the main channels of 
growth. 
 
Future work in this area will present a new estimate of potential output for the 
economy based on the standard growth accounting model presented here.  It will 
also examine the implications for Irish growth of significant expected changes in 
population trends over the next 30 to 40 years with Ireland, like all major 
European countries, set to experience a significant decline in the proportion of 
people in the working age category.  
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TABLE 1 Decomposition of Output Growth Rates: 1987-1996 
 
Economy Total TFP Capital Total Labour 
Belgium 2.2 1.3 0.9 0.0 
Germany 1.9 1.3 0.8 -0.2 
France 1.9 1.2 0.7 0.0 
Greece 2.3 1.9 0.4 0.1 
Ireland 7.2 4.3 1.2 1.6 
Italy 1.6 0.8 0.7 0.1 
Spain 2.8 0.4 1.2 1.1 
United Kingdom 2.5 1.7 0.9 -0.1 
Sweden 2.1 1.6 0.5 -0.1 
Finland 2.0 2.2 0.4 -0.6 
Luxembourg 4.9 1.5 1.4 2.0 
Portugal 3.0 0.5 1.5 1.0 
Austria 2.7 1.7 1.0 -0.1 
Netherlands 3.1 1.2 1.0 0.9 
Source:  Own estimates. 
 
 
TABLE 2 Decomposition of Output Growth Rates: 1997-2006 
 
Economy Total TFP Capital Total Labour 
Belgium 1.8 0.3 0.8 0.7 
Germany 1.1 1.0 0.5 -0.4 
France 1.7 0.8 0.9 0.1 
Greece 4.2 2.0 1.2 0.9 
Ireland 4.9 1.1 2.1 1.8 
Italy 1.2 -0.2 0.8 0.6 
Spain 3.3 -0.1 1.6 1.9 
United Kingdom 2.9 1.4 1.1 0.3 
Sweden 2.9 2.1 0.8 0.0 
Finland 2.9 1.7 0.8 0.4 
Luxembourg 3.7 0.6 1.7 1.4 
Portugal 0.9 -0.3 1.2 0.0 
Austria 2.0 1.1 0.7 0.1 
Netherlands 1.6 0.7 0.9 0.0 
Source:  Own estimates. 
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TABLE 3 Decomposition of Average Labour Growth Rates: 1987-1996 
 
Economy Total Population Participation 
Rate 
Employment 
Rate 
Workweek 
Belgium 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.0 -0.7 
Germany -0.2 0.4 0.2 -0.2 -0.7 
France 0.0 0.4 0.4 -0.1 -0.8 
Greece 0.1 0.7 0.4 -0.5 -0.5 
Ireland 2.5 0.8 1.8 1.0 -1.2 
Italy 0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.1 0.0 
Spain 1.7 0.3 1.1 0.3 -0.1 
United Kingdom -0.1 0.3 -0.2 0.2 -0.3 
Sweden -0.1 0.4 -0.6 -0.4 0.5 
Finland -0.9 0.4 -0.5 -0.7 -0.1 
Luxembourg 3.0 1.3 2.1 -0.1 -0.4 
Portugal 1.5 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.7 
Austria -0.1 0.4 0.2 -0.1 -0.6 
Netherlands 1.4 0.6 1.1 0.2 -0.5 
Source:  Own estimates. 
 
 
TABLE 4 Decomposition of Average Labour Growth Rates: 1997-2006 
 
Economy Total Population Participation 
Rate 
Employment 
Rate 
Workweek 
Belgium 1.0 0.5 0.6 -0.3 0.2 
Germany -0.6 0.0 0.3 -0.4 -0.5 
France 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.0 -0.6 
Greece 1.4 0.3 1.0 0.4 -0.4 
Ireland 2.7 1.9 1.3 -0.1 -0.5 
Italy 0.9 0.6 0.2 0.6 -0.4 
Spain 2.8 1.5 1.3 0.6 -0.6 
United Kingdom 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.0 -0.4 
Sweden 0.0 0.4 0.3 -0.3 -0.4 
Finland 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.4 -0.4 
Luxembourg 2.1 1.3 2.3 -0.4 -1.1 
Portugal 0.0 0.6 0.5 -0.7 -0.3 
Austria 0.2 0.5 0.5 -0.2 -0.6 
Netherlands 0.1 0.4 0.4 -0.2 -0.5 
Source:  Own estimates. 
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TABLE 5 Decomposition of Output Growth Rates: 2007-2012 
 
Economy Total TFP Capital Total Labour 
Belgium 0.4 -0.7 0.7 0.4 
Germany 0.7 -0.1 0.4 0.3 
France 0.0 -0.6 0.7 -0.2 
Greece -4.5 -3.0 0.8 -2.2 
Ireland -1.3 0.7 0.7 -2.6 
Italy -1.4 -1.0 0.4 -0.8 
Spain -0.8 0.1 0.9 -1.8 
United Kingdom -0.5 -1.3 0.8 0.0 
Sweden 1.0 -0.4 0.9 0.5 
Finland -0.6 -1.2 0.7 0.0 
Luxembourg 0.0 -2.8 1.5 1.3 
Portugal -1.2 -0.2 0.4 -1.4 
Austria 0.6 0.0 0.5 0.1 
Netherlands 0.0 -0.9 0.7 0.1 
Source:  Own estimates. 
 
 
TABLE 6 Decomposition of Average Labour Growth Rates: 2007-2012 
 
Economy Total Population Participation 
Rate 
Employment 
Rate 
Workweek 
Belgium 0.6 0.8 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 
Germany 0.5 -0.1 0.3 0.7 -0.4 
France -0.3 0.5 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1 
Greece -3.3 0.2 0.4 -3.9 0.0 
Ireland -4.0 0.6 -1.8 -2.2 -0.6 
Italy -1.2 0.5 0.1 -1.0 -0.8 
Spain -2.7 0.6 0.4 -4.0 0.3 
United Kingdom 0.0 0.7 0.0 -0.6 -0.2 
Sweden 0.8 0.8 0.1 -0.3 0.3 
Finland -0.1 0.5 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 
Luxembourg 1.9 1.9 0.8 -0.2 -0.6 
Portugal -2.1 0.1 -0.5 -1.6 -0.1 
Austria 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.0 -0.9 
Netherlands 0.2 0.5 0.1 -0.4 0.0 
Source:  Own estimates. 
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FIGURE 1 Year-on-Year Growth (%) in Real Irish GNP 1987:1 - 2013:1
 
 
Source:  AMECO. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 Year-on-Year Growth (%) in Total Irish Hours Worked 1987:1 - 2013:1
 
 
Source:  AMECO + own estimates. 
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FIGURE 3 Year-on-Year Growth (%) in Irish Capital Stock 1987:1 - 2013:1
 
 
Source:  AMECO + own estimates. 
 
 
FIGURE 4 Year-on-Year Growth (%) in Irish TFP 1987:1 - 2013:1
 
 
Source:  AMECO + own estimates. 
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  ESRI Research Notes 2014/4/2 
Two-Speed Recovery? Spatial Development 
in Ireland 
*Edgar Morgenroth 
Over recent times there has been some suggestion that there is a two-speed 
recovery in the Irish Economy, with the recovery being concentrated in Dublin, 
while other parts of the country are still stuck in recession. This implies that the 
regional development pattern in the recovery is one of divergence and the focus 
on the recovery only might suggest that this pattern of divergence is different to 
that seen either during the downturn or the boom. This note considers the 
evidence on spatial development patterns in Ireland during the recent economic 
recovery and during the previous period. 
 
Regional Output Growth 
Nationally, the economic downturn, which started late in 2007 and lasted until 
2010, reduced real GDP by 9 per cent. Between 2010 and 2013, real GDP 
increased by just over 2.6 per cent, indicating a weak recovery.
1 In per capita terms  real GDP declined by 12.6 per cent reflecting the fact that 
the population was still growing while the economy contracted. The recovery has 
also been more modest in per capita terms with real per capita GDP up by 1.8 per 
cent in 2013 compared to 2010.  
 
The latest regional data on Gross Value Added (GVA)2 are for 2011, so these are 
of limited use in considering the spatial development patterns during the 
recovery. Nevertheless the analysis of these data yields some interesting results. 
In order to account for the fact that population growth is not evenly distributed 
around the country this aspect of spatial development is accounted for by 
considering per capita output. 
 
Firstly, the recession did not hit all regions at the same time. While Dublin, the 
Mid-East and the Mid-West regions peaked in terms of per capita real GVA in 
2007, the Border, Midland and West regions peaked in 2006 indicating that the 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1  Calculations based on the CSO National Income and Expenditure Tables. 
2  CSO, County Incomes and Regional GDP. 
* edgar.morgenroth@esri.ie  
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recession started earlier in these latter regions (see Figure 1). However, two 
regions, namely the South East and the South West experienced a reduction in 
per capita real GVA from 2002 onwards i.e. they were in recession while the rest 
of the country still boomed.  
 
Secondly, there is significant heterogeneity with respect to the size of the decline. 
While nationally per capita real GVA declined by 12.8 per cent3 between 2007 
and 2010, regions such as the Border (-30 per cent), Midland (-31 per cent) and 
Mid-East (-28 per cent) experienced a significantly sharper recession. Other 
regions such as Dublin (-11 per cent), the West (-11 per cent) and the South West 
(-12 per cent) fared better than the national average, suggesting that the large 
urban centres (Dublin, Cork and Galway) have been less affected by the economic 
downturn. 
 
Thirdly, as of 2011 the Midland, Mid-East and Mid-West regions have not 
recorded real per capita GVA growth, so at least up to that point they had not 
emerged from recession. In contrast, the Border, Dublin, South East and South 
West regions have recorded growth and  the West region has grown such that 
real per capita GVA in 2011 was higher than at any previous point i.e. that region 
more than recovered from the downturn. While growth in the Border (0.9 per 
cent) and South East (1.1 per cent) regions has been modest and both regions 
only started growing in the 2010 to 2011 period, strong growth has been 
recorded in the West (6 per cent), Dublin (3.9 per cent), and South West (5.2 per 
cent). Again the regions with the cities Dublin, Cork and Galway are seen to 
perform better. 
 
Noticeable in Figure 1 is the increasing spread across the regions suggesting 
divergence. In particular, Dublin and the South West appear to be on distinct 
growth trajectory from other regions. However, rather than being a phenomenon 
that has occurred only since the recession, the figure clearly shows that there has 
been growing divergence since the onset of the “Celtic Tiger” in 1995. Formally, 
the coefficient of variation has increased from 0.19 to 0.32 between 1995 and 
2011. Within that period the annual change in the coefficient of variation was 
positive in 11 out of the 16 years and the increase was on average larger than the 
decrease.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3  Note that the difference between GDP and GVA growth is due to the fact that there are slight definitional differences 
between the two measures.  
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FIGURE 1  Per Capita Real Gross Value Added (GVA) at Market Prices 
 
Source:  Own calculations based on CSO County Incomes and Regional GDP. 
 
The increasing urban focus of development is also supported by analysis at the 
small area level. Significant locational preferences for different sectors were 
found in an analysis of the economic geography of Ireland using 2006 data.4 
Specifically, the more high value-added and high-tech sectors tend to prefer or 
require urban locations. An update of the analysis using 2011 data reveals that 
urban areas have increased their share in economic activity by 4.1 per cent 
overall and in 21 out of 30 sectors since 2006. This suggests that firms in urban 
locations have fared better during the economic crisis. Urban areas  accounted 
for 72 per cent of all employment in 2011 compared to 68 per cent in 2006. 
Remote areas account for just 6.6 per cent of employment in 2011, down from 
7.6 per cent, while economically central areas have increased their share of 
employment from 66.6 per cent to 68.2 per cent. 
 
Nationally GDP per capita and GNP per capita started growing again in 2010 and 
2011 respectively. Thus, the published data on regional GVA which cover the 
period up to 2011 cannot shed light on the recovery at the regional level. It is 
however possible to estimate the regional GVA up to 2013 since National Income 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
4  Morgenroth E., (2009). “Exploring the Economic Geography of Ireland” Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry 
Society of Ireland, Vol. 38, pp.42-69. 
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and Expenditure (NIE) tables for the period up to 2013 are available.5 These 
estimates suggest that Dublin and the South West have experienced per capita 
output growth from 2011. The West has also had some growth but that growth 
stalled in 2013. The Mid-East and the South East recorded an increase in GVA 
between 2011 and 2012 but have seen a reduction in per capita output in 2013. 
Per capita GVA declined in the Border and Midland regions until 2012 but grew in 
2013. Finally, the Mid-West is estimated to have recorded a continued decline in 
per capita GVA.  
 
This analysis shows that regions with a large urban centre, primarily Dublin, the 
South West and more recently the West, are on a different development 
trajectory compared to the other regions. The data show that this has been a long 
established pattern which implies that this two-speed development is not 
confined to the recent economic recovery.  
 
Regional Employment and Unemployment  
In addition to output, employment and unemployment are also important 
business cycle indicator and published data on these are more up to date.  
However, as this relates to where employed and unemployed persons reside 
rather than where the economic activity takes place, it is important to be mindful 
of commuting patterns which particularly affect the data for Dublin and the 
neighbouring Mid-East regions. 
 
Unemployment and employment at the regional level during the recent economic 
crisis were analysed in Morgenroth (2013),6 which also found significant 
heterogeneity and divergence across the regions. That study also found that 
unemployment rates would have reached much higher levels if there had not 
been a significant decline in labour force participation. This dampening effect was 
found to be most significant in the Border region. Here the focus is not on 
decomposing the changes in the unemployment rate but to consider whether 
different regions follow different development paths that are reflected in 
employment. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
5  This is achieved by assuming that the productivity differences across regions in the three broad sectors Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fishing, Industry and Services remain unchanged and applying these to the productivity for the period 
up to 2013 as implied by the NIE, and multiplying the productivity by the numbers employed which are published as 
part of the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS). This method also relies on an implicit assumption that 
commuting patterns are fixed. 
6  See Morgenroth, E. (2013). “The Regional Dimension of the Unemployment Crisis”. ESRI Research Note 2012/4/3. 
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  W i nt er  201 4 |  75  
 
   
Nationally, employment peaked in the third quarter of 2007 and reached its 
lowest point in the first quarter of 2012 having fallen by 15.9 per cent. As in the 
case of GVA, across the regions both the timing of the peak number employed 
and the lowest point differ.  The Border, Midland, Dublin, Mid-East and South 
West all saw peak employment in the third quarter of 2007, while the peak for 
the West was recorded one quarter earlier and the Mid-East and South East 
peaked three quarters later. Employment in the South East and South West 
increased during the period leading up to the economic crash in 2007 while GVA 
was falling post-2002, which implies falling labour productivity.  
 
The first region to reach the lowest point of employment was the South West 
(first quarter 2011) while the Mid-West recorded its lowest number of employed 
persons in the first quarter of 2014. The reduction in employment between peak 
and trough varied between 14.6 per cent (West) and 22.7 per cent (Border). All 
regions have recorded at least some employment growth at some point since the 
crisis but for both the West and the Mid-West, employment in 2014 is at its 
lowest level since the crisis started. This implies that in terms of employment the 
recovery has not started in either of these regions.7 There is a negative 
correlation between the regional contraction in employment and the subsequent 
recovery, which indicates that some regions with a more significant reduction in 
employment during the crash are experiencing a stronger recovery although they 
also tend to have a more delayed recovery. These include the Border, Midland 
and South East. 
 
A simple way to measure the long term evolution of regional employment is to 
show the level of employment in every year relative to employment in a starting 
period. Figure 2 shows how regional employment has evolved relative to the level 
of employment in 1995. The figure shows that the employment growth 
performance of the regions has differed significantly. The Mid-East in particular 
recorded the strongest employment growth in the period after 1995, with 
employment doubling by 2008. The second fastest employment growth was 
recorded in the Midland while the lowest growth rates were recorded in the Mid-
West and Border regions. Thus, while there is divergence across regions, some 
regions like the Midland that perform poorly with respect to output growth have 
fared relatively well with respect to employment while others such as the West 
and Dublin, which have done well with respect to output have not done as well in 
terms of employment. This is at least partly explained by the substantial cross-
regional commuting, where workers commute from their place of residence for 
example in the Mid-East and Midland to Dublin where the output is produced.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
7  Both regions recorded some increase in employment followed by further declines in employment. 
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FIGURE 2  Regional Employment Relative to Employment in 1995. 
 
Source:  Own calculations based on CSO Labour Force Survey and CSO Quarterly National Household Survey. The data from 1998 
onwards are for the second quarter of each year. 
 
 
Overall, employment growth has been largely concentrated in Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fishing and in Accommodation and Food Services.8 Figure 3 below 
shows that there are some differences in terms of sectoral employment growth 
across regions. The growth in the Accommodation and Food Services sector was 
particularly pronounced in the Dublin and South East regions. Construction 
employment increased in the Midland, Mid-East and South East regions. Financial 
and other business service employment increased in the West, Mid-East, South 
East and South West regions. Employment in Industry grew in the Mid-East and 
Midland regions but declined in the Border, West, Dublin and South West 
regions. Growth in employment in Industry is negatively related to total 
employment growth in regions.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
8  It should be noted that the numbers relating to Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing have been affected by changes in the 
sampling frame and may thus not give an accurate measure of the rate of change. 
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FIGURE 3  Sectoral Contributions to Employment Growth between 2011 and 2014 by Region. 
 
Source:  Based on CSO Quarterly National Household Survey.  
 
The numbers unemployed and the unemployment rate are also important labour 
market indicators. Figure 4 shows the evolution of the unemployment rate. The 
lowest unemployment rates are found in Dublin and the South West and the Mid-
East, while the highest rates are in the South East, Midland and Border regions. 
The fact that the Midland region has a high unemployment rate but also a higher 
than average rate of employment growth appears to be contradictory. However 
closer analysis reveals that the labour force in the Midland has expanded faster 
than employment.  
 
During the period 1998 to 2007 the differences in unemployment rates appear to 
be relatively stable, but they increased significantly during the crisis. More 
recently these differences appear to have reduced again, which implies that the 
recovery is benefitting those regions with higher unemployment more. More 
formal analysis indicates that regional unemployment rates converged up to 
2007, then diverged until 2011 and converged again since then. Of course the 
reduction in the unemployment rate may also be due to higher emigration or 
reductions in the labour force participation rate,9 resulting in a smaller labour 
force. While changes to the labour force participation rate have been found to be 
dampening the unemployment crisis in some regions (notably the Border), given 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
9  See Morgenroth, E. (2013). “The Regional Dimension of the Unemployment Crisis”. ESRI Research Note 2012/4/3. 
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the lack of published data it is difficult to establish to what extent emigration is 
reducing unemployment rates in some regions.  
 
FIGURE 4  Regional Unemployment Rates  between 1998 and 2014 
 
Source:  CSO Quarterly National Household Survey. 
 
Apart from the data from the CSO QNHS, the Live Register provides a useful 
alternative measure of unemployment. It differs from the QNHS as those 
employed on a part-time, seasonal or casual basis may sign on the Live Register, 
but would be deemed employed using the official International Labour 
Organization (ILO) definition of employment. Thus, the numbers of persons 
signing on the Live Register tends to be greater than the number of persons 
recorded as unemployed in the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS). 
One advantage of these data is that they are available at the county level and for 
individual local offices of registration. The number of persons signing on to the 
Live Register peaked in July 2011 when the number signing on reached over 
470,000. In most counties the peak was also reached in 2011, except for Limerick, 
Longford and Waterford where the Live Register had already peaked in 2010. In 
Monaghan, Offaly the Live Register peaked in 2012, and Carlow, Kildare, Laois it 
peaked in 2013. However, the data show that since the peak in the summer of 
2011, the number of persons signing on the Live Register has declined in every 
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county (see Figure 5). The graph shows that the county with the largest reduction 
in the Live Register (Limerick) recorded more than double the percentage decline 
recorded in the county with the smallest reduction (Laois). 
At the level of the 123 local registration offices, the peak number signing on was 
reached in the majority (61 per cent) in 2011, while 28 per cent reached the peak 
in 2010, 16 per cent in 2012 and just 14 (11 per cent) peaked in 2013. While the 
Live Register declined in each office significant variation in the percentage 
reduction across offices is shown in Map 1 for the period July 2011 to October 
2014. The map shows that the registration offices in the Midland, most of the 
South East and some of the North West recorded a lower reduction in the Live 
Register than other offices. 
 
FIGURE 5  Percentage Change in the Live Register Between July 2011 and October 2014 by County 
 
Source:  Based on CSO Live Register. 
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MAP 1.  Percentage Reduction in the Live Register Between July 2011 and October 2014 by Local Office of 
Registration. 
 
Source:  The data are from the CSO Live Register Statistics. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
In summary, output has followed a long-run pattern of regional divergence with 
higher levels of output being recorded particularly in the Dublin and South West 
regions. Since 1995 employment has grown more in commuter regions such as 
the Mid-East, Midland and South East, which implies that there is some positive 
spillover into some other regions from the stronger economic performance of 
Dublin and Cork. The unemployment rate is lowest in Dublin and the Mid-East 
and highest in the South East and Midland regions. Overall the development 
patterns in the recovery are similar to those seen in the 1995 to 2007 period. 
Thus, while it is correct to refer to a two-speed recovery, focusing solely on the 
recovery ignores the fact that over the longer term there has been renewed 
divergence in terms of economic activity, which is due to structural differences 
that have not been addressed during the boom.  
 
While most of the analysis in this paper focused at the regional level, as Map 1 
showed, there is considerable heterogeneity within regions. This heterogeneity 
implies that it is likely that peripheral parts of strongly performing regions, such 
as the South West, are not as dynamic as the region overall. 
 
The pattern of output growth is consistent with the international evidence of 
urban-led growth based on agglomeration economies. Agglomeration economies 
arise through cheaper production costs and a larger customer base in 
agglomerations. The international literature has also shown that productivity is 
higher in areas with higher employment densities. Related Irish research has 
found a strong preference of high value-added sectors for urban locations, which 
is important since high levels of output and income can only be maintained with 
high value-added activities.10 An update of the analysis using 2011 data reveals 
that urban areas have increased their share in economic activity by 4.1 per cent 
overall and in all 21 out of 30 sectors since 2006. This suggests that enterprises in 
urban locations have fared better during the economic crisis. Urban areas now 
account for 72 per cent of all jobs compared to 68 per cent in 2006. Remote areas 
account for just 6.6 per cent of jobs in 2011, down from 7.6 per cent. Overall jobs 
are 11 per cent more spatially concentrated in 2011 compared to 2006.11  
 
Agglomerations also have an advantage for workers as the likelihood of finding 
the right job increases with the number of firms. However, in contrast to firms 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
10  Morgenroth E., (2009). “Exploring the Economic Geography of Ireland” Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry 
Society of Ireland, Vol. 38, pp.42-69 
11  The analysis uses data from a special tabulation of the travel to work data from the Census of Population. Details of 
the data and analysis are outlined in Morgenroth (2009). 
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which need to be located in the agglomeration to derive significant benefit, 
workers do not have to live in the agglomerations to benefit from them. Rather 
they can benefit by commuting into the agglomerations. Thus, the benefits of 
agglomeration spill into neighbouring areas by reducing unemployment rates and 
increasing the numbers that are employed. There is significant international 
evidence that high-skilled individuals tend to choose larger urban areas to live in, 
and for Ireland there is also strong evidence that this is the case. For example 75 
per cent of those holding a PhD reside in urban areas.12 This results in a virtuous 
circle for the larger urban centres which are able to attract more employers due 
to the availability of highly skilled workers. 
 
From a policy perspective the observed development patterns have important 
implications. The spatial pattern of both economic activity and population is 
driven by strong agglomeration forces that are self-reinforcing and that increase 
aggregate economic performance. Policies to counteract these forces should 
therefore be avoided as they are likely to be ineffective and damaging to national 
welfare. Efficiency enhancing agglomerations also imply that regional balance, i.e. 
equal levels of economic activity (output), is not going to be achieved. Rather, the 
focus of policy should be to ensure that the wider hinterland can benefit from the 
labour market benefits of the agglomerations. However, policy must also avoid 
increasing sprawl, which implies unsustainable transport patterns, and should 
therefore focus on measures that make urban areas and villages more attractive 
places to reside in.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
12  Own calculations based on 2011 CSO Census data from the Small Area Population Statistics (SAPS).  
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